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Legislative Update on the State Adoption of the 1987 
Revision to the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act of 1968 
Daphne D. Sipes* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State 
Laws (NCCUSL) 1 first proposed the Uniform Anatomical Gift Act 
(UAGA) in 1968.2 The UAGA, with an organized approach to organ 
donation procedures, was considered a success, in that forty-one states 
passed it within an eighteen-month period. 3 The remaining jurisdic-
tions soon followed, and all fifty states, plus the District of Columbia, 
adopted a substantially similar version of the UAGA. 4 
However, several factors have eroded the original objectives of the 
1968 Uniform Act. 11 For example, the states have changed procedures 
* Associate Professor of Business Law at the University of Texas at San Antonio; B.A. 1975, 
J.D 1978, University of South Carolina. 
1. Seven states organized the Conference of State Boards of Commissioners on Promoting 
Uniformity of Law in the United States in 1892. In 1915, the Conference was reorganized into 
the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws [hereinafter NCCUSL], which 
is composed of representatives from each state and from the District of Columbia and Puerto Rico. 
M. RoszKOWSKI, BusiNESS LAW 14 (2d ed. 1989). The commissioners are appointt'd by the 
governors of their jurisdictions. After a proposed act is approved by the NCCUSL, it is then 
forwarded to each legislature for consideration. Coordination with the legislature may or may not 
be through a particular commissioner. 5ff also R. HoEBf:R,]. REITZEL, D. LYI>EN, ?'-/. RnBFRTS 
& G. SEVERANCE, CoNTEMPORARY BusiNESS LAW 27 (2d ed. 1982). 
2. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, 8A U.L.A. (1968) [hereinafter 1968 UAGAJ. For treat-
ment on the adoption of the UAGA, see Dukeminier, Supplying Orgam for Tramplantation, 68 
MICH. L. REv. 811 (1970); Louisell, Thf Procumnml of Organs for Tramplonla/1011, M Nw. 
L. REv. 607 (1970); Petty & Heck, Li[f Afln Dmth-The Ultimate Goalfin TransjJ!rwtation, 
27 N.Y.L. ScH. L. REv. 1207 (1982); Richards, Mfdiral-Lrgal Problnns ofOrr;an TrawjJionla-
tion, 21 HASTINGS L.J. 77 (1969); Sanbar, MFdicolFgal A1pects of Human Orr;an Tran,planla-
twn, 12 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRACT. 1 (Apr. 1984); Note, Heart Tra111j!lanl1. i.efial Ob-
starlfs To Donation, 45 CHI.[-]KENT L. REV. 78 (1968); Note, Hetmling Human Organ., Unda 
The L'nifonn CommNrial Codf, 16 joHN MARSHALL L. REv. 393 (1983); Note, Thr Sail' oj 
Human Parts, 72 MICH. L. REV. 1182 (1972); Note, Human Orr;an Tran,jJiantatwn-Thr 
MN!iral Mirarle and thf LFgal Mau, 20 S.C.L. REv. 419 (1968); Note, Legal A.~prct' oj Tissur 
Donation from Cadm•frs, 21 SYRACUSE L. REV. 825 (1970); Note, Ler;al Problnns in !Jonation.' 
of Human Tissufs to Medical Srimce, 21 VAND. L. REv. 352 (1968). 
3. Dukeminier, supra note 2, at 817 (1970). The first 24 states adopted the Act within a 14-
month period. Note, The Salf of Human Parts, supra note 2, at 1184. 
4. 1968 UAGA, supra note 2, Prifatory Naif 15-18. 
5. In presenting the 1968 UAGA, the commissioners represented that "I ilt wili provide a 
395 
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relating to the execution of donor cards. Many states have amended 
their Uniform Gift Act by deleting the requirement of two witnesses on 
a donor card when a donor personally signs. 6 The use of drivers' li-
censes as donor cards opting for donation has become more prevalent. 7 
However, a survey revealed that only seventeen percent of potential do-
nors had actually executed a donor card. 8 Even when donor cards have 
been executed, only a small percentage are personally carried and are 
often not timely discovered.9 It has also been recognized that while the 
useful and uniform legal environment throughout the country for this new frontier of modern 
medicine." 1%8 UAGA, .1ujna note 2, at 18. 
The laws now on the statute books do not, in general, deal with these legal questions in 
a complete or adequate manner. The laws are a confusing mixture of old common law 
dating back to the seventeenth century and state statutes that have been enacted from 
time to time . . In short, both the common law and the present statutory picture is 
one of confusion, diversity and inadequacy. This tends to dismurage anatomical gifts 
and to create difficulties for physicians, especially for transplant surgeons. 
!d. at 17. Stt also 1987 UAGA, infra note 6, at 3. 
6. Uniform Anatomical Gift Act, SA U.L.A. (1987) [hereinafter 1987 UAGA]. "In 1980, the 
NCCUSL voted to make optional the language that previously required the donor card to be 
signed 'in the presence of two witnesses who must sign the document in his presence.'" !d. 
7. At the time of the proposal of the 1968 UAGA, the commissioners recommended that the 
use of drivers' licenses for indicating organ donors he actively encouraged. 1968 UAGA. 111jnrt 
note 2, at § 4. That option has been incorporated into the 1987 UACA, \lljna note 6, at § 2(c). 
Not all state driver license provisions for donation are sufficient for the purpose intended. 
Iowa has specifically declared that a driver's license, although indicating that the driver is a donor, 
is insufficient without the additional UAGA donor card. IoWA CoDE ANN. § 321 189(1) (West 
1985). Stt Overcast, Evans, & Bowen, Prohlrm.1 111 th1· Jdrntifimlion of Polrnlial Organ Donon, 
251 JAMA 1559-62 (1984) [hereinafter Overcast]. 
In the days prior to the acceptance of the 1968 UAGA, some commentators stated "there is 
something macabre, even repulsive, about a society where people walk around with little cards 
saying thev have donated their organs on death to so-and-so." Sanders & Dukeminier, ,\lrdiw/ 
Ad1•ancr and Lrp:al Lag: Hrmod/{/lYJt' and Kidnry Trrwsj,lanlalirm, 15 UCLA L. Rts. 357, 
364 (1968). Paradoxically, this view was espoused by two who are recognized for publicizing a 
movement towards accepting presumed consent in the harvesting of cadavers' parts. Dukeminier, 
.1upra note 2, at 837-38 n.98. 
8. 1987 UAGA, 1UjJra note 6, Prefaton Sotr. Recent surveys indicate that 70o/o to 75% of 
the American people are in favor of organ donations. Action 7-8 (May-June 19H5) (newsleller 
published by the American Council on Transplantation [ACT], listing results of a 1985 Gallup 
Poll conducted on behalf of ACT). Sixty-two percent would not mind if their organs were donated 
even if they had not previously given permission. Sipes, Stair, Fnlrmi Strtluln Guir/1' Orp:an 
Donation Prom/urn, 68 HEALTH PROGRESS 46, 49 (1987) (citing 1985 Gallup poll). 
The American public's view toward organ giving has been consistent. A Gallup poll con-
ducted in 1968 indicated that 70o/o were willing to donate their bodies. Note, Thr Salr oj 1/tunan 
Parts, .\Upra note 2, at 1185 n.23. 
9. Task Force on Organ Transplantation, Office of Organ Transplantation, U.S. Dept. of 
Health and Human Services, Organ TrrliiSjJian/alton: lssun and Rt'rmnmmdations (find! re-
port), at 29 (Apr. 1986) [hereinafter Task Force Report]. Srr also Note, Htunrut Orp:nn Tmn,. 
plan/a/triii-Thr .\lrrlim/ ,'.1nnrlr, .\Upra note 2, at n.56 and accomp<tnying text (discussing the 
problems with mistaken identification); Overcast, supra note 7. 
In 1984, Congress enacted the National Organ Transplant Act, which established the Task 
Force on Organ Transplantation. 42 U.S.C. § 273 (Supp. 1985). The Task Force's final report 
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1968 Uniform Act was established to provide a uniform means for do-
nating organs, it does not actively encourage donation. 10 
One effort to encourage and increase donation was introduced be-
tween 1985 and 1987, when most states adopted "routine inquiry /re-
quired request" lawsY Generally, "routine inquiry /required request" 
laws encourage donation by requiring a hospital protocol that timely 
requests the next of kin to consider consenting to an anatomical dona-
tion. In some states, the laws were amendments to the state UAGA; in 
other states, the laws were enacted in addition to the UAGA. A poten-
tial conflict resulted in those states that adopted a routine inquiry act 
without considering the effect on their existing Uniform Gift ActY For 
example, although the 1968 UAGA grants both civil and criminal im-
munity to any person who acts in good faith, the Texas "routine in-
quiry" act incorporated a separate immunity clause which relieves any 
person who acts in good faith, except in the case of the "person's own 
negligence." 13 Thus, the Texas "routine inquiry" law may conflict 
with the Texas UAGA and perhaps expose organ procurement person-
nel to legal liability. 
Another development occurred in 1986 with the promulgation by 
Congress of Hospital Protocols for Organ Procurement and Standards 
was filed in May 1986 and reported on the legal, medical, ethical, economic and social barriers til 
organ dqnation. Srr gmrrally Sipes, supra note 8, at 46-48; Sipes, RrquPIIinp; Orp;rlll nona/ions: 
A Xru' Stair Approach to Organ Transplants, 8 HEALTH LAw IN CANADA 39, 51 (1987). 
10. Caplan & Bayer, Prrfacr to Ethical, Lrgal and Policy Issurs Pnlrnninp; to Solid Orp;an 
Prorurnnmt, HASTINGS Ct:NTER REP., at i (Oct. 1985) (Report of the Project on Organ 
Transplantation). 
11. D. Sipes, supra note 9, 8 HEALTH LAW IN CANADA at 51. The terms "required re· 
quest/routine inquiry" are used interchangeably and are basically similar. A "required request" 
means requiring a hospital to request the family to consent to a donation. A "routine inquiry" 
means to routinely ask the family about the extent of their organ donation information. Typically, 
state and/or federal law requires the routine inquiry, so that the end result is very similar. 
By the end of 1988, 43 states had adopted a version of "required request/routine inquiry" 
legislation. Rrquirrd Rrqurst Laws, STATE HEALTH NOTES 1 (June 1988) (a publication of the 
Intergovernmental Health Policy Project, George Washington University) and Orp;an Tmn,·j,/rw-
talion, OVERVIEW OF 1988 LAWS 1 (unpublished document of the Intergovernmental Health Pol-
icy Project, George Washington University). South Dakota and Vermont have passed resolutions 
pertaining to required request, but Idaho, Iowa, South Carolina, Utah, and Wyoming have not 
enacted required request laws as of the end of 1988. Organ Trrznspianlalion, 111jna, ar 2. 
12. Sipes & McGaw, An Updatr on Organ Donation Lrgisialion, 8 NATCO 21-22 (feb. 
1988) (publication newsletter of North Atlantic Transplant Coordinators Organization) 
The primary area of conflict was the ability of the ranking family members to veto either 
each other or the decedent's previously executed anatomical gift. /d. at 22 (citing California, \lin-
nesota, and Ohio). Another example of a conflict between the state UAGA and the routine inquiry 
act occurred in Georgia. Georgia's order of next of kin differ in each statute. SPt Sipes, supm note 
9, at 44. SN also id. at nn.57, 65, 73-74 and accompanying text (citing other examples of mnllicts 
between state routine inquiry laws and the UAGA). 
13. TEX. REv. Crv. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-2, § (8a) (Vernon Supp. 1989) (effective Apr. 22, 
1987). 
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for Organ Procurement Agencies. 14 The federal law pressured the 
states into once again accepting legislation that encouraged organ dona-
tion by requiring all participating Medicaid/Medicare hospitals to es-
tablish a protocol to make families aware of their option to consent to 
donate or to decline to donate. 15 
In 1984, the executive committee of the NCCUSL approved a 
committee to study the anatomical gift legislation and, subsequently, a 
drafting committee began work in 1985 to propose amendments to the 
1968 UAGA. A committee draft for discussion purposes only was cir-
culated in 1986.16 In the summer of 1987, a final version of the revised 
Uniform Anatomical Gift Act (1987 UAGA) 17 was approved by the 
NCCUSL at its annual conference. The American Bar Association 
then approved the Act at its annual meeting on February 9, 1988. 18 
In 1988, three states took the lead in enacting the 1987 UAGA: 
California/9 Connecticut,20 and Hawaii.21 By the fall of 1989, another 
five states enacted versions of the 1987 UAGA: Arkansas,22 Idaho,23 
Montana,24 Nevada,25 and North Dakota.26 Eight other states have 
considered bills proposing adoption of the 1987 UAGA. 27 
14. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-509, § 9318, 100 Stat. 
1875, 2009 (amending Title XI of the Social Security Act at§ 1138) (effective Oct. 1, 1987). This 
legislation provides, in pertinent part, that to be eligible for Medicaid/Medicare the hospitals 
must have written protocols that identify potential donors and "(i) assure that families of potential 
organ donors are made aware of the option of organ or tissue donation and their option to decline, 
and (ii) encourage discretion and sensitivity with respect to the circumstances, views, and beliefs of 
such families. "!d. at§ 1138(a)(1) (codified at 42 U.SC. § 1320(a)(1)(A)(i)- (ii) (Supp. II 
1984)). 
15. !d. 
16. The draft is dated Nov. 1, 1986. Draft for Discussion Only, Ammdmfllt\ to Uniform 
Anatomical Gift Act, NCCCUSL (Nov, 1, 1986). 
17. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at 2-3. 
18. Sipes & McGaw, U.VOS & Uniform Anatomzcal Gift Art Rfl'i.liOill, 3 NEPHROLOGY 
NEWS & ISSUES 21 (june 1989). 
19. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Com:§§ 7150-7156.5 (Deering Supp. 1989) (effective Jan. 1, 
1989). 
20. CoNN. GEN. STAT.§§ 19a-279a to -280a (Supp. 1989) (effective July I, 1989). 
21. HAW. REv. STAT. § 327-1 (Supp. 1988) (effective June 13, 1988). 
22. ARK. STAT. ANN. §§ 20-17-601 to -613 (Supp. 1989). 
23. IDAHO CODE §§. 39-3401 to -3417 (Supp. 1989) (signed 3/29 /89). 
24. 1989 Mont. Laws 540 (signed 4/14/89). 
25. 1989 Nev. Stat. 200 (passed 5/26/89). 
26. N.D. Cmr. CoDE §§ 23-06.02-01 to .02-12 (1989) (signed Apr. 11, 198'J) (effective 
July 12, 1989). 
27. Jurisdiction where bills were filed: Georgia (adopted several amendments in 1988. ap-
parently from the 1987 UAGA); Illinois (SB 546) (filed 4/5/89) (failed, lost in committee); Iowa 
(HB 257) (failed); Minnesota (SF 1222 & HF 1101) (pending), Oklahoma (SB 410) (pending), 
Ohio (HB 21) (pending), Virginia (H 1569) (tabled), Wisconsin (AB 550) (pending), Wyoming 
(SB 120) (failed). 
Interested jurisdictions where no bills were filed: Maine, Michigan, Nebraska, Rhode Island, 
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The purpose of this article is to review the new provisions of the 
1987 UAGA and to compare them with the versions that have been 
enacted in the eight states and to identify the reasons why the 1987 Act 
will not be enacted as progressively as its 1968 predecessor. 
II. THE 1987 UAGA 
A. Comparison with the 1968 UAGA 
The 1968 UAGA contains eleven sections: 
(1) Definitions, (2) Persons Who May Execute an Anatomical Gift, 
(3) Persons Who May Become Donees; Purposes for Which Anatom-
ical Gifts May be Made, (4) Manner of Executing Anatomical Gifts 
(5) Delivery of Document of Gift, (6) Amendment or Revocation of 
the Gift, (7) Rights and Duties at Death, (8) Uniformity of Interpre-
tation, (9) Short Title, (10) Repeal, (11) Time of Taking Effect.28 
In comparison, the 1987 UAGA contains seventeen sections: 
(1) Definitions, (2) Making, Amending, Revoking, and Refusing to 
Make Anatomical Gifts by Individual, (3) Making, Revoking, Ob-
jecting to Anatomical Gifts, by Others, (4) Authorization by [Coro-
ner][Medical Examiner] or [Local Public Health Official] (5) Routine 
Inquiry and Required Request; Search and Notification, (6) Persons 
Who May Become Donees; Purposes for Which Anatomical Gifts 
may be Made, (7) Delivery of Document of Gift, (8) Rights and Du-
ties at Death, (9) Coordination of Procurement and Use, (10) Sale or 
Purchase of Parts Prohibited, (11) Examination, Autopsy, Liability, 
(12) Transitional Provisions, ( 13) Uniformity of Application and 
Construction, (14) Severability, (15) Short Title, (16) Repeals, (17) 
Effective Date.29 
In general, the 1987 Act serves four primary functions. First, it 
further simplifies the manner of making an anatomical gift (Sections 2-
3 & 6-8). Next, it clarifies the three potential donor groups in order of 
hierarchy: an individual of his/her own body organs and/or tissues 
(Section 2); the next of kin (Section 3); and a public health official 
(Section 4). Then the Act incorporates a uniform "routine inquiry" 
standard (Sections 5 & 9). Finally, it makes the sale and/or purchase 
of certain organs and tissues illegal (Section 1 0). 
Tennessee, U.S. Virgin Islands. 
28. 1968 UAGA, supra note 2. 
29. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6. 
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B. Section by Section Comparison of the 1987 UAGA to the 1968 
UAGA with State Adoption Analysis 
1. Section One of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Definitions: 
As used in this [Act]: 
(1) "Anatomical gift" means a donation of all or part of a human 
body to take effect upon or after death. 
(2) "Decedent" means a deceased individual and includes a still-
born infant or fetus. 
(3) "Document of gift" means a card, a statement attached to or 
imprinted on a motor vehicle operator's or chauffeur's license, 
a will or other writing used to make an anatomical gift. 
(4) "Donor" means an individual who makes an anatomical gift 
of all or part of the individual's body. 
(5) "Enurleator" means an individual who is [licensed][certified] 
by the [State Board of Medical Examiners] to remove or pro-
cess eyes or parts of eyes. 
(6) "Hospital" means a facility licensed, accredited, or approved 
as a hospital under the law of any state or a facility operated 
as a hospital by the United States government, a state, or a 
subdivision of a state. 
(7) "Part" means an organ, tissue, eye, bone, artery, blood, fluid, 
or other portion of a human body. 
(8) "Person" means an individual, corporation, business trust, es-
tate, trust, partnership, joint venture, association, government, 
governmental subdivision or agency, or any other legal or 
commercial entity. 
(9) "Physician" or "surgeon" means an individual licensed or oth-
erwise authorized to practice medicine and surgery or osteopa-
thy and surgery under the laws of any state. 
(1 0) "Procurement organization" means a person licensed, accred-
ited, or approved under the laws of any state for procurement, 
distribution, or storage of human bodies or parts. 
(11) "State" means a state, territory, or possession of the United 
Sates, the District of Columbia, or Commonwealth of Puerto 
Rico. 
(12) "Technician" means an individual who is [licensed] [certified] 
by the [State Board of Medical Examiners] to remove or pro-
cess a part. 
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The 1987 UAGA definitions are not a significant departure from 
the 1968 Act. 30 The definitions section of the 1987 Act adds five 
terms. 31 Two of the terms, (5) "Enucleator" and (12) "Technician," 
have been modified in the states adopting the 1987 Act because of the 
varying methods or official organizations by which the non-physician 
specialists are certified. 
b. State adoptions of Section One: 
Arkansas: Arkansas has adopted all of the definitions, but a "tech-
nician" is required to be under the direction or supervision of a surgeon 
or hospital. 32 This differs from the proposed 1987 UAGA by requiring 
the technician to be supervised, instead of independent. 
California: California has substantially adopted all of the defini-
tions, and adds that a pacemaker device is also defined to be an ana-
tomical part which can be donated. 33 
Conneticut: Conneticut has adopted all but one of the terms; it 
excludes "enucleator," which is not significant since the term "techni-
cian" incorporates anyone trained by the American Association of Tis-
sue Banks or the Eye bank Association of America. 34 
Hawaii: Hawaii is similar to Arkansas in that all of the defini-
tions have been adopted and a "technician" is required to be under the 
supervision of a licensed physician. 35 
Idaho: Idaho adopted all of the terms and added "enucleation."36 
Montana: Montana adopted all of the terms and added "depart-
ment" and "ophthalmologist. " 37 
Nevada: The Nevada terms are substantially similar, but Nevada 
30. The NCCUSL has again deferred the issue of including a definition of death since most 
states have a definition of death similar to the Uniform Determination of Death Act. 1987 UAGA, 
supra note 6, § 1 comment. 
31. The terms are: (I) "Anatomical gift" and (3) "Document of gift," which were originally 
in Sections 4 & 5 of the 1968 UAGA. Also added are (5) "Enucleator," (10) "Procurement organ-
ization" (which was originally included as a "Bank or storage facility" in Section 1 (a) of the 1968 
Act), and (12) "Technician." 
32. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-601 (Supp. 1989). 
33. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE§ 7150.1(a), (g) (Deering Supp. 1989) Georgia also 
includes a heart pacemaker as a "part" in its Anatomical Gift Act. GA. Com: ANN. § 44-5-142(5) 
(Supp. 1988). 
34. CONN. GEN. STAT. § !9a-279a.(11) (Supp. 1989). 
35. HAw. REv. STAT.§ 327-1(12) (Supp. 1989). 
36. IDAHO CoDE§ 39-3401(5) (Supp. 1989). Idaho also adds a section that requires its state 
health department to maintain a registry of storage facilities that certify that quality assurance 
tests are conducted for AIDS. /d. at § 39-3402. Srr infra note !51. 
37. MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 72-17-102(3), (8) (1989). Montana does not adopt the sections in 
the same order as the 1987 Act. 
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elected not to amend the term "person" to include the usual inclusive 
laundry list of potential members. 38 
North Dakota: North Dakota has included all of the terms except 
"person. " 39 
2. Section Two of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Making, Amending, Revoking, and Refusing to Make Anatom-
ical Gifts by Individual: 
(a) An individual who is at least [18] years of age may (i) make an 
anatomical gift for any of the purposes stated in Section 6(a), (ii) 
limit an anatomical gift to one or more of those purposes, or (iii) 
refuse to make an anatomical gift. 
(b) An anatomical gift may be made only by a document of gift 
signed by the donor. If the donor cannot sign, the document of 
gift must be signed by another individual and by two witnesses, 
all of whom have signed at the direction and in the presence of 
the donor and of each other, and state that it has been so signed. 
(c) If a document of gift is attached to or imprinted on a donor's 
motor vehicle operator's or chauffeur's license, the document of 
gift must comply with subsection (b). Revocation, suspension, 
expiration, or cancellation of the license does not invalidate the 
anatomical gift. 
(d) A document of gift may designate a particular physician or sur-
geon to carry out the appropriate procedures. In the absence of a 
designation or if the designee is not available, the donee or other 
person authorized to accept the anatomical gift may employ or 
authorize any physician, surgeon, technician, or enucleator to 
carry out the appropriate procedures. 
(e) An anatomical gift by will takes effect upon the death of the 
testator, whether or not the will is probated. If, after death, the 
will is declared invalid for testamentary purposes, the validity of 
the anatomical gift is unaffected. 
(f) A donor may amend or revoke anatomical gift, not made by will, 
only by: 
( 1) a signed statement; 
(2) an oral statement made in the presence of two individuals; 
(3) any form of communication during a terminal illness or in-
jury addressed to a physician or surgeon; or 
( 4) the delivery of a signed statement to a specified donee to 
whom a document of gift had been delivered. 
38. 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, §§ 1 to 5.5. & NEv. REV. STAT.§§ 451.520, .525, .530, .535, .545, 
& .550, as amrnded by 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, §§ 16-21. "Person" is already defined at NEv. Rt:v. 
STAT. § 451.540. 
39. N.D. CENT. CODE § 23-06.2-01 (Supp. 1989). 
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(g) The donor of an anatomical gift made by will may amend or 
revoke the gift in the manner provided for amendment or revoca-
tion of wills, or as provided in subsection (f). 
(h) An anatomical gift that is not revoked by the donor before his 
death is irrevocable and does not require the consent or concur-
rence of any person after the donor's death. 
(i) An individual may refuse to make an anatomical gift of the indi-
vidual's body or part by (i) a writing signed in the same manner 
as a document of gift, (ii) a statement attached to or imprinted on 
a donor's motor vehicle operator's or chauffeur's license, or (iii) 
any other writing used to identify the individual as refusing to 
make an anatomical gift. During a terminal illness or injury, the 
refusal may be an oral statement or other form of 
communication. 
U) In the absence of contrary indications by the donor, an anatomi-
cal gift of a part is neither a refusal to give other parts nor a 
limitation on an anatomical gift under Section 3 or on a removal 
or release of other parts under Section 4. 
(k) In the absence of contrary indications by the donor, a revocation 
or amendment of an anatomical gift is not a refusal to make 
another anatomical gift. If the donor intends a revocation to be a 
refusal to make an anatomical gift, the donor shall make the 
refusal pursuant to subsection (i). 
403 
The changes in Section 2 of the 1987 Act do not represent a sig-
nificant departure from the 1968 Act;40 instead, the mechanisms for 
expressing one's desire to make or not to make an anatomical gift are 
clarified. Section 2 of the 1987 Act emphasizes the presumption to 
make a gift. Unless an individual has clearly refused to make a dona-
tion, there is no presumption that silence automatically implies refusal 
to donate. 
Originally, the 1968 Act required two witnesses when a person 
executed his/her own donor card.41 But now, the 1987 Act does not 
require any witnesses, unless the donor is not able to sign personally.42 
Like the 1968 UAGA,43 a gift may also be made orally if the donor is 
not able to sign, provided the document is signed and witnessed by two 
other people. 44 
40. Section 2 of the 1987 Act is the equivalent of former Sections 4 and 6 of the 1968 Act. 
Specifically, Section 2(a) is former Section 2(a). Section 2(b) is former Section 4(b). Section 2(c) 
incorporates the typical driver's license laws. Srr supra note 7. Sections 2(d), (e), (f) and (g) are 
former Sections 4(d), 4(a), 6(a)-(b), and 6(a) of the 1968 Act, respectively. 
41. Srr supra note 6. 
42. 1987 UAGA, sujna note 6, at § 2(b). 
43. 1968 UAGA, supra note 2, at § 4(b). 
44. 1987 UAGA, sujna note 6, at § 2(b). 
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One significant clarification is found in Section 2(h), which un-
equivocally states that an individual's consent to the donation of his/her 
organs/tissues cannot be overridden. The import of this section is un-
derscored in the Report of the Task Force on Organ Transplantation,46 
which found that health care professionals were routinely and unneces-
sarily confirming with a donor's next of kin the donor's intention to 
donate.46 In fact, if a family member objected, then the donation was 
probably not accepted.47 This routine practice violated the 1968 Act 
and may have resulted in a reduction in the number of organs available 
for transplantation. 48 
Sections (i), G), and (k) clarify the concepts of amendment, revoca-
tion, and refusal. If, for example, a person had executed a donor card 
indicating his desire to donate his heart and kidneys, but later revoked 
the card, the presumption is only that the person "has neither made nor 
refused to make an anatomical gift."49 A person who has consented to 
give his/her kidneys has not eliminated the possibility of donating addi-
tional organs or tissues. Only a refusal places a person in the category 
of being an unavailable donor. 
However, Section 2 alone will not increase organ donations. It op-
erates in connection with the subsequent Sections 3 and 4, which first 
permit the family to consider making a donation, and if there is no 
available family, then a proper official may make a donation. Thus, a 
potential donor, who has neither made nor refused to make a gift, may 
become a donor if his next of kin consents or if a proper official con-
sents, under certain conditions. 
The 1987 Act also unofficially offers forms to indicate consent or 
refusal to make a gift. 
45. 'il'l' 1lljJra note 9. 
46. "]P]hysicians are reluctant to retrieve organs on the basis of these cards alone, and almost 
always require the consent of the next of kin." Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 29. The Task 
Force criticized the medical profession on several counts. "Physicians and nurses are in a position 
to facilitate organ donation but too frequently do not . . The failure of many health profes-
stonals to participate in the organ donation process will remain a major barrier to organ donation 
unless measures are taken to overcome the underlying causes." /d. at 43. "[P]hysicians should not 
avoid participating in organ procurement out of fear of legal liability" since the occurrence of law 
suits is "extremely rare." /d. at 30. 
47. Caplan, Ort;nn Prorurnnmt: It's Not In Thr Cnrds, 14 HASTINGS CENTER REP. 9, 11 
iOn. 1 984). In comparing France with America, Caplan notes that even in France, which has 
strong wntten presumed consent legislation, there is an unwillingness on the part of the French 
physicians to procure organs without the permission of the next of kin. /d. 
48. 1987 UAGA, sujna note 6, at § 2(h) comment. 
49. !d. at § 2(k) comment. 
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b. State adoptions of Section Two: 
Arkansas: Arkansas has adopted the entire section and has added 
two additional sections. Section (1) mandates that the highway depart-
ment issue licenses with the gift option. 50 Section (m) officially incorpo-
rates the forms suggested by the 1987 Act. 51 
California: There are no deviations from the 1987 version in the 
California section. 52 
Conneticut: Conneticut has adopted the entire section with one 
change in subsection (b), where the word "only" is deleted. 53 This 
change is an improvement to the 1987 UAGA. By using the word 
"only," the 1987 UAGA apparently limits the manner of making a gift 
to a written document. In fact, the 1987 UAGA permits a written gift 
to be amended orally, and thus, an additional gift could be made by an 
oral amendment without the necessity of executing another written doc-
ument of gift. 54 Thus, the Conneticut modification is not significant and 
remains consistent with the intention of the 1987 UAGA. 
Hawaii: Hawaii's section is verbatim. 55 
Idaho: Idaho's section is verbatim.56 
Montana: The Montana section is substantially similar.57 
Nevada: Nevada's comparable section is substantially similar to 
Section 2 of the 1987 Act. 118 
North Dakota: The North Dakota section is substantially 
similar. 119 
3. Section 3 of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Making, Re<'oking, and Objecting to Anatomical Gifts, by 
Others: 
(a) Any member of the following classes of persons, in order of pri-
ority listed, may make an anatomical gift of all or a part of the 
decedent's body for an authorized purpose, unless the decedent, 
at the time of death, has made an unrevoked refusal to make 
that anatomical gift: 
50. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17 -602( 1) (Supp. 1989). 
51. !d. at § 602(m) 
52. CAL. Ht:AI.TH & SAFETY Com: § 7150.5 (Deering Supp 198'.1). 
53. CoNN. Gt:N. STAT. § 19-a-279b (Supp. 1989). 
54. 1987 CAGA, 111jna note 6, at § 2([)(2), (f)(3). 
55. HAw. Rt:v. STAT. § 327-2 (Supp. 1989). 
56. IDAHO ConE § 39-3403 (Supp. 1989). 
57. MoNT. Cont: ANN.§ 72-17-201 (1989). 
58. Nt:v. Rt:v STAT. § 451.555 (1987), as amfndfd by Nt:v. Rt:v. STAT.§ 200.22 (1989). 
59. N.D. Ct:NT. Com: § 23-06.2-02 (Supp. 1989). 
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( 1) the spouse of the decedent; 
(2) an adult son or daughter of the decedent; 
(3) either parent of the decedent; 
( 4) an adult brother or sister of the decedent; 
(5) a grandparent of the decedent; and 
( 6) a guardian of the person of the decedent at the time of 
death. 
(b) An anatomical gift may not be made by a person listed in sub-
section (a) if: 
(1) a person in a prior class is available at the time of death to 
make an anatomical gift; 
(2) the person proposing to make an anatomical gift knows of a 
refusal or contrary indications by the decedent; or 
(3) the person proposing to make an anatomical gift knows of 
an objection to making an anatomical gift by a member of 
the person's class or a prior class. 
(c) An anatomical gift by a person authorized under subsection (a) 
must be made by (i) a document of gift signed by the person or 
(ii) the person's telegraphic, recorded telephonic, or other re-
corded message, or other form of communication from the person 
that is contemporaneously reduced to writing and signed by the 
recipient. 
(d) An anatomical gift by a person authorized under subsection (a) 
may be revoked by any member of the same or prior class if, 
before procedures have begun for the removal of a part from the 
body of the decedent, the physician, surgeon, technician, or enu-
cleator removing the part knows of the revocation. 
(e) A failure to make an anatomical gift under subsection (a) is not 
an objection to the making of an anatomical gift. 
There are no significant changes from the 1968 Act. 60 Section 3 
simply gives to the next of kin an opportunity to make a donation, 
provided there is not already a donor card, a refusal, or known contrary 
intent. 61 If a decedent has merely failed to make a gift, his kin may do 
so, ac1:ording to the ranking priority classes. Consistent with Section 2, 
a family member may also add to a decedent's gift by making addi-
tional organs available. 
Another important clarification is the effect of an undecided family 
member. Under the former Act, if a higher priority member was 
60. Section 3 of the !987 UAGA, .IUpra note 6, is the equivalent of Sections 2(b) and 4(c) of 
the 1968 liAGA. 
61. If there is already a gift card in existence or a refusal to make a gift, then the priority 
class members cannot override that intention. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 2(h). Sff a/10 
suprn note 46 and accompanying text (discussing physicians' reluctance to harvest without family 
consent. despite the presence of a donor card). 
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"available" but could not decide whether to make a gift, that would 
probably end any further inquiry. As a consequence, if a lower priority 
member desired to make a gift, but an available higher priority member 
was simply undecided, no gift would likely result. Now, however, if a 
higher class member is available but does not clearly object to authoriz-
ing an anatomical gift, then the ambivalence allows a lower priority 
member to act and to make a gift. 62 However, no lower priority mem-
ber can override a higher priority member who has objected to the 
making of a gift. In fact, if a ranking member becomes available and 
objects even after a lower ranking member has agreed to a gift, the 
donee may not accept the gift, if removal procedures have not yet 
begun.63 
A family member must be "available at the time of death" to be 
able to consent to a gift, but the term is not defined in either the 1987 
or 1968 Act. The definition has been addressed by Illinois and Califor-
nia. With the adoption of the 1968 UAGA, California originally re-
quired a "diligent search" and a certification of the nonavailability of 
the kin. 64 Illinois modified its standard of "available" in 1986 by adopt-
62. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, § 3(e) comment. 
63. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 3(d). The hierarchy is preserved throughout the 1987 
UAGA, since a priority member may revoke a gift made by a member of the same class or of a 
lower class. /d. 
64. California added§ 7151.6 at the time of the adoption of the 1968 Act (repealed by 1988 
Cal. Stat. I 095, § I). The act provided a detailed standard for determining "availability." A "dili-
gent search" was required by an accredited hospital, which had to certify that a check of missing 
persons and other records had been undertaken for 24 hours. /d. A 24-hour search could render 
many organs unuseful, although the search could be started in anticipation of death. SPP also CAL. 
HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 7151.5 (Deering Supp. 1989) (in the new UAGA, which maintains 
the language of former § 7151.6). 
California permitted the coroner in earlier days to make certain donations. SPP Quay, Utiliz-
ing thP Bodits ofthr Drad, 28 ST. LoUis U.L.J. 889,924 n.121 (1984) and accompanying text; 
Sadler & Sadler, Transplantation and thr Law: Thr Nrrd for Organiud Smsitit•ity, 57 GEo. 
L.J. 5, nn.68-69 & accompanying text ( 1968) (citing §§ 7113 to -15 of the CAL. HEALTH & 
SAn:TY CoDE that were the autopsy statutes that allowed the coroner to authorize tissue removal 
without family knowledge or consent if a search similar to that described in § 7151.5 (Deering 
Supp. 1989) was carried out). 
Illinois amended its UAGA in 1988 to define a standard of when the family is considered to 
be "available." ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. IIOYz, § 303(b)-(c) (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1989). The act re-
quires a search of the decedent's hospital records and telephone contact of any possible family 
members. The Illinois standard originated from the Illinois Organ Donation Request Act, effective 
January I, 1987. Srr id. § 752(c). 
Texas has also incorporated a type of a definition of "available" family members with the 
adoption of its routine inquiry law in 1987 but has not yet specifically amended its UAGA to 
incorporate a similar requirement. TEx. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-2, § 8A(h) defines 
"available" through the "good faith" immunity clause, which requires "making reasonable efforts 
to locate and contact" the family. /d. SrP infra note 87. 
Arizona spells out a standard for determining availability in its Corneal Removal Statute. 
ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 36-851 A(3)(c), C (Supp. 1989). Cf ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN.§ 36-349 
408 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 4 
ing language from its "required request" act that specifies what is 
meant by searching for family members. 811 
Another clarification 1s the substitution of "knowledge" for 
"notice. " 88 
The 1987 UAGA proposes a form for the next of kin to sign. 
b. State adoptions of Section Three: 
Arkansas: The Arkansas section is verbatim.87 
California: There are two limitations in the California version. In-
stead of the 1987 UAGA's list of ranking members, California's highest 
priority begins with anyone who has a "power of attorney that ex-
pressly authorizes" permission to make an anatomical gift.88 The other 
limitation is contingent on another California act, which prohibits any 
one from making an anatomical gift for another person if that person 
had "known" (religious) beliefs that depends "solely upon prayer for 
. healing" or opposes the purposes of the 1987 UAGA.89 
Connecticut: The section is substantially similar in Connecticut.70 
Hawaii: Hawaii's section is verbatim. 71 
Idaho: Like California, Idaho substitutes as the first priority class 
the holder of a "power of attorney for health care."72 Otherwise, the 
remaining section is equivalent. 73 
Montana: Montana's equivalent section is verbatim, although the 
(Supp. 1989) (requiring an attempt be made to locate the family for the Arizona "routine in-
quiry" law). A "diligent effort" to contact the next of kin means telephoning the next of kin at 15 
minute intervals, for a period of not less than 4 nor more than 5 hours following death, which 
must be documented in a log. I d. 
65. Illinois Organ Donation Request Act, ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110Vz § 752(c). 
66. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 3 comment. The Comment explains that the standard of 
knowledge "is a more useful concept than actual notice." /d. The 1968 UAGA used the standard 
of "actual notice" throughout. Sn 1968 UAGA, supra note 2, § 2(b)-(c). Sff also infra text at 
note 88. 
67. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-603 (Supp. 1989). 
68. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE§ 7151(a)(l) (Deering Supp. 1989). 
69. /d. at § 7152. 
Only an individual may make an anatomical gift of all or part of the individual's body 
or pacemaker, if it is made known that the individual at the time of death was a mem-
ber of a religion, church, sect, or denomination which relies solely upon prayer for the 
healing of disease or which has religious tenets that would be violated by the disposition 
of the human body or parts thereof or a pacemaker for any of the purposes stated in 
subdivision (a) of Section 7153 [parallel to Section 6 of the 1987 UAGA]. 
/d. (formerly§ 7151.7). California had added this section when the 1968 UAGA was adopted in 
1970. 
70. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279c (Supp. 1989). 
71. HAw. REv. STAT. § 327-3 (Supp. 1989). 
72. IDAHO Com: § 39-3404(1 )(a) (Supp. 1989). 
73. /d. at § 39-3404. 
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overall order of the subsections is varied from the 1987 Act. 74 
Nevada: Nevada has added that "[ t ]he legal procedure for authori-
zation must be defined and established by the committee on anatomical 
dissection by the University of Nevada System."7~ The remainder of 
Section 3 is substantially adopted by Nevada. 
North Dakota: The section is substantially similar to the 1987 
Act.7s 
4. Section Four of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Authorization by [Coroner )[Medical Examiner J OR [Local 
Public Health Official}: 
(a) The [coroner][medical examiner] may release and permit the 
removal of a part from a body within that official's custody, for 
transplantation or therapy, if: 
(1) the official has received a request for the part from a 
hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement 
organization; 
(2) the official has made a reasonable effort, taking into ac-
count the useful life of the part, to locate and examine 
the decedent's medical records and inform persons listed 
in Section 3(a) of their option to make, or object to mak-
ing, an anatomical gift; 
(3) the official does not know of a refusal or contrary indica-
tion by the decedent or objection by a person having pri-
ority to act listed in Section 3(a); 
( 4) the removal will be by a physician, surgeon, technician; 
but in the case of eyes, by one of them or by an 
enucleator; 
(5) the removal will not interfere with any autopsy or 
investigation; 
(6) the removal will be in accordance with accepted medical 
standards; and 
(7) cosmetic restoration will be done, if appropriate. 
(b) If the body is not within the custody of the [coroner][ medical 
examiner], the [local public health officer] may release and per-
mit the removal of any part from a body in the [local public 
health officer's] custody for transplantation or therapy if the 
requirements of subsection (a) are met. 
(c) An official releasing and permitting the removal of a part shall 
74. 1989 Mont. Laws 540, § II. 
75. 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, § 6(1) (formerly NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.555.2). This is not a 
change from the previous UAGA in Nevada, which had incorporated the requirement when the 
1968 UAGA was adopted. 
76. N.D. CENT. ConE § 23-06.2-03 (Supp. 1989). 
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maintain a permanent record of the name of the decedent, the 
person making the request, the date and purpose of the request, 
the part requested, and the person to whom it was released. 
'Section 4 of the 1987 UAGA could be considered to be a novel 
concept, but the provision is actually an extension of a principle found 
in both the 1968 Act and in many existing state "unclaimed body" 
statutes. 77 
Section 4 is a derivative of the 1968 UAGA's lowest priority class 
authorized to make anatomical gifts of a decedent. In the 1968 Act, if 
all higher priority members were unavailable at the time of a potential 
donor's death, then "any other person authorized or under obligation to 
dispose of the body"78 could execute an anatomical gift. This lowest 
ranking class would include any other statutory relative or, if none, the 
public official responsible as a matter of law for disposing of the re-
mains.79 The 1987 UAGA has expanded this lowest priority class into 
a separate, potential donor group.80 Thus, the overall scheme of the 
77. There are three basic types of laws governing dead bodies: autopsy statutes that permit 
the family to authorize an autopsy, unclaimed body statutes that allow delivery to schools for 
education and scientific purposes, and the coroner /medical examiner laws that allow complete 
post-mortem exams in criminal investigation without the family's consent. Sadler & Sadler, supra 
note 64, at 13-14. 
78. 1968 UAGA, supra note 2, at § 2(b)(6). Thus, if the body is unclaimed, the duty falls 
upon a public official to bury or deliver the body to a medical school. The public is relieved of the 
expense usually if the medical school receives the body. Note, The Lau' of Derul Bodies: Impeding 
Medical Progress, 19 Omo ST. L.J. 455, 458-59 (1958). 
79. In the late eighteenth century, the medical need for cadavers exceeded the supply. Be-
cause of medical schools purchasing cadavers, "grave robbing" became a prevalent profession. 
Comment, Property in Corpses, 5 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 280, 294 (1958). The English Anatomy Act 
of 1832 was enacted to allow schools to receive the bodies of paupers and the unclaimed. American 
anatomy acts followed soon thereafter. Dukeminier, Suppl)'ing Organs for Transplantation, 
supra note 2, at n.2; Note, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical Progress, supra note 78, 
at 455. These "unclaimed body" statutes are also referred to as "anatomy" statutes, and vest 
authority in coroners to deliver unclaimed bodies to medical schools for research and dissection. 
See Sadler & Sadler, supra note 64, 13-15; Sanders & Dukeminier, sujJra note 7, at 395, 403 
(1968); Comment, supra note 79, at 294-95; Note, The Law of Dead Bodies: Impeding Medical 
Progress, supra note 78, at 459 (1958); Note, Legal Problems in Donation of Human Tissue to 
Medirnl Science, supra note 2, at 354-56. 
See, e.g., N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAW § 4301, as amended, (McKinney Supp. 1989), which 
provides the same. Thus, the coroner may consent to corneal tissue and/or pituitary gland removal 
from a body in New York, if no kin are available at death. N.Y. Pus. HEALTH LAw § 4222 
(McKinney Supp. 1989). 
80. When the 1968 UAGA was originally proposed, the commissioners recognized cadavers 
as a potential source of organ and tissue donors. "[I]t may prove desirable in many if not most 
states to authorize and direct medical examiners to expedite their autopsy procedures." 1968 
UAGA, supra note 2, at § 7(c) comment. 
The Task Force recommended that states enact legislation requiring coroners and medical 
examiners to give permission for organ and tissue procurement when families have consented. The 
Task Force also recommended legislation requiring the coroners/medical examiners to evaluate all 
nonheart-beating cadavers for possible organ and tissue donation and to provide the next of kin 
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1987 Act allows for three possible donors: an individual of his/her own 
body parts, next of kin, or an authorized public official.81 
However, there are prerequisites to an official making the anatom-
ical gift: 
( 1) The body must be under the authority of the official. 
Thus, if there is not a reason for the official to have custody, then 
it would not be proper for a coroner to authorize removal. 82 
(2) There must be a request to remove a body part by a hos-
pital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organization for the pur-
poses of transplantation or therapeutic purposes. Thus, the official 
should not initiate the removal. Therefore, Section 4 does not 
mandate the removal of organs, it only permits the public official 
to make a decision, and only in the event that there has first been 
a proper request. 
(3) The official must make "a reasonable effort" to inform 
the kin of the option to donate or to object. If the next of kin are 
"available,"83 Section 4 is nullified because the next of kin can 
exercise their right to consent or to object to an anatomical gift per 
Section 3.84 The new Act limits the ability of a non-relative official 
to "give away" the organs of a deceased person to the situation 
when no ranking family are available and there have first been 
reasonable efforts to locate the family. 811 If, however, the kin are 
with postmortem donation opportunities. Task Force Report, supra note 9, at 31. 
81. The 1987 UAGA comment to Section 4 explains that "[i]f an anatomical gift is not made 
pursuant to Section 3, the provisions of Section 4 apply." 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 4 
comment. 
The order of officials is also ranked; if the body is not under the coroner's jurisdiction, then 
the next official is the local health officer. !d. at § 4(b) 
82. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla.), rat. dnzird, 107 S. Ct. 2202 (1986) (holding 
that the state corneal tissue removal act is not unconstitutional because it gives the medical exam-
iner the right to remove corneal tissue without the notice or consent of the next of kin; however, 
the statute is not activated unless the body is properly under the jurisdiction of the medical exam-
iner and a request for the tissue has been made). Whether the deceased is under the jurisdiction of 
the coroner may be an issue, depending upon the wording of relevant statutes. The plaintiffs also 
alleged that the autopsies were unnecessary as the deaths were clearly accidental and not suspi-
cious. Srr a/.1<1 Georgia Lions Eye Bank v. Lavant, 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985), rat. 
dmird, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986) (sudden infant death syndrome gives coroner jurisdiction over the 
body). The autopsy statutes may grant broad autopsy authority. If there is a possible benefit to 
science, the coroner may automatically have the right to perform an autopsy and thus the possible 
right to consent to a tissue removal. Cf. Hicks v. NLO, Inc., 631 F. Supp. 1207 (S.D. Ohio 1986) 
(widow alleged a conspiracy between physicians and the coroner to obtain jurisdiction fraudulently 
over her husband's body and to perform an unnecessary autopsy. The court denied the complaint 
without sufficient facts and noted that the autopsy act grants blanket jurisdiction to autopsy any 
unusual or violent death and to remove tissues necessary for testing). 
83. Srr SlljJra note 64 and accompanying text. 
84. 1987 UAGA, sujJra note 6, at § 3(b)(1)-(3). 
85. However, the s~arch could be suspended if the useful life of the organ is in jeopardy. 
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not available and there is a request for a usable organ, then the 
removal may be authorized without the knowledge of the kin, only 
if a "reasonable effort" has been made to locate the family. 86 The 
term "reasonable effort" is not defined. Some groups may welcome 
the lack of specificity; others, however, may desire a more defined 
method for the "reasonable effort" required in the search for the 
relatives. 87 
( 4) The official must not "know" of any actual contraindica-
tion by either the decedent or the prioritized next of kin. 88 If the 
official has conducted the required "reasonable effort" to inform 
the kin, then this prerequisite would also take into account any 
information that has come to the official's attention about the fam-
ily's desires or beliefs from non-family sources. If the official 
knows of a desire not to give, the gift cannot be made, even though 
the ranking family members are not "available" to consent or to 
object. 
(5) The removal of the parts must be by a physician, surgeon, 
or technician. 
( 6) The removal must not interfere with any autopsy or 
investigation. 
(7) The removal must be in accordance with "accepted medi-
cal standards." 
(8) Cosmetic restoration must be made, if necessary. 
1987 UAGA, 111jna note 6, at § 4. 
The duty to search the medical record or to inform next of kin is limited to 'a reasona-
ble effort taking into account the useful life of the part .' If removal must be 
immediate and there is no medical or other record and no person specified in Section 
3(a) is present, the requirement of subsection (a)(2) is satisfied. 
!d. at 9 4 comment. 
86. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 4(a)(2). 
87. However, too much specificity could lead to a standard that appears fair, but is difficult 
to comply with in certain cases. Sff, f.[;., Arizona, supra note 64. The rarity of published cases 
resulting in liability also indicates that the approach used in the 1968 UAGA, 111pm note 2, has 
been appropriate and protective. Sff supra note 46 (Task Force Report noting legal cases "ex-
tremely rare."). 
88. SPP .IUjJra note 66. In Nicolleta v. Rochester Eye & Human Parts Bank, Inc., 136 /\lise. 
2d 1065, 519 N.Y.S.2d 928 (1987), the UAGA's immunity clause standard of "reasonablr" and 
the "actual notice" was tested. In that case, the apparent common law wife of the deceased had 
consented to the donation of the deceased's eyes. The father of the deceased objected, upon learn-
ing of the removal, alleged that the hospital should have known that the donor was not a legally 
authorized donor. The court held in favor of the defendant and pointed out that a nurse had 
indeed questioned the woman when she had used a different last name than that of the deceased. 
However. the nurse had been given a plausible explanation, and the other people in the company 
of the "wife" had not contradicted the explanation. Thus, the court concluded that the inquiry was 
reasonable and that there was no evidence of "actual notice" to the defendant that the woman was 
not an authorized donor under the New York Anatomical Gift Act. !d. at 931. 
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Thus, the integrity of the ranking of family over the officials is 
still preserved in Section 4, since any "available" family must be con-
sulted about the gift. And, even if the family is not "available," the 
offici;:d's power to make a gift is only activated upon certain conditions 
precedent, which include not only a request for a gift but also a "rea-
sonable effort" to locate the family. 
All but Connecticut and Nevada have retained Section 4(a). 
b. State adoptions of Section Four: 
Arkansas: Arkansas' equivalent to Section 4(a) of the 1987 Act 
combines the authority for either the coroner or a hospital administra- · 
tor to permit removal, depending upon the respective official's custody 
of the body.89 This version therefore eliminates the necessity of the 
companion section suggested in Section 4(b) of the 1987 Act. Section 
4(c) of the 1987 Act is adopted.90 
California: In the California version, there are three possible 
groups of officials who may be authorized to release an anatomical gift, 
with each of the classes dependent upon who has custody of the body. 91 
California also includes a "religious beliefs" exception.92 
The chief modification in the California section is the retention 
from a former California law93 that a search for the next of kin be 
conducted for twenty-four hours before a release of organs is to be al-
lowed, except in the case of eyes, or unless loss of time would render 
the part unuseful. 94 Thus, the California standard of a prior twenty-
four hour search is nullified if time is of the essence. The California 
version also allows removal for "reconditioning,"911 in addition to 
"transplantation or therapy. " 96 
Before a hospital (as opposed to the medical examiner or other 
official) can grant removal, California specifies that the hospital make a 
"reasonable effort" to contact relatives, "determine[] and certif[ y] that 
the persons are not available,"97 check the missing persons' list, and 
8<J. 1989 Ark. Arts 436, at § 4. The jurisdiction over the body depends upon the location of 
the bodv and the cause of death. 
90. !d. at § 4(b). 
91. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Com~§ 7151.5(a)-(c) (Deering Supp. 1989). The three groups 
are the coroner /medical examiner, the hospital, and the local public health care official. 
92. !d. at § 7152. SrP sujna note 69. 
93. Sn llljJra note 64 (repealed). 
94. CAL Ht:AI.TH & SAFETY ConE§ 7151.5(a)-(c) (Deering Supp. 1989). 
95. !d. at§ 7151.5(a). 
96. /d. 
97. !d. at§ 7151.5(b). 
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question anyone who has been present with the decedent. 98 The Cali-
fornia standard still provides leeway in deciding whether the useful life 
of the part is in jeopardy such that a search for less than twenty-four 
hours may be reasonable. 
Connecticut: Connecticut omits Section 4. Instead, Section 19a-
279d states that "[ t]he chief medical examiner shall serve as a 
facilitator for tissue harvesting and organ procurement within the con-
straints imposed by his official investigative responsibilities."99 This 
section does not specifically grant to the medical examiner any author-
ity to allow a removal of organs or tissues if a request for transplanta-
tion is made. The Connecticut version may either signal that the broad 
authority granted by Section 4 in the 1987 Act is not to be given to 
non-relatives or that the public officials did not desire the additional 
authority to donate offered by Section 4(a). 
Hawaii: In Hawaii's equivalent to Section 4(a) of the 1987 Act, 
the "medical examiner, coroner, or coroner's physician" may permit 
removal. 100 In the section comparable to Section 4(b), the "director of 
health" may permit removal if the body is not within the jurisdiction of 
the other listed officials. 101 
A significant departure from the 1987 Act is that the requesting 
person/ entity must be the one that "certifies" that a "reasonable effort" 
to locate the decedent's medical records and to inform the kin has been 
conducted. 102 Therefore, Hawaii's version shifts the responsibility of 
the certification, and probably the search, away from the coroner to the 
requesting entity /person. The Hawaii version is probably a favorable 
compromise in terms of allocating responsibility and the practical bene-
fit that is derived by the requesting party. 
Idaho: The section is verbatim in Idaho. 103 
Montana: The Montana section is almost verbatim, but instead of 
requiring compliance with "accepted medical standards," Montana's 
compliance for removal of the part need only be "in accordance with 
accepted standards."104 
Nevada: Like Connecticut, Nevada did not adopt Section 4 of the 
1987 Act. 10~ 
98. !d. Note that California imposes a seemingly higher standard on the hospital than on the 
coroner or medical examiner by requiring both certification and a defined search. !d. 
99. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279d (Supp. 1989). 
100. HAw. REV. STAT. § 327-4(a) (Supp. 1989). 
101. !d. at § 327-4(b). 
102. !d. at § 327-4(a)(l), (2), 4(b). 
103. IDAHO Com: § 39-3405 (Supp. 1989). 
104. 1989 Mont. Laws 540, § 12(1)([). 
105. In the original bill, A.B. 226, Section 7 did include the equivalent of Section 4; however, 
395] UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 415 
North Dakota: The North Dakota section is substantially similar 
to the 1987 Act. 106 
5. Section Five of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Routine Inquiry and Required Request; Search and 
Notification: 
(a) On or before admission to a hospital, or as soon as possible 
thereafter, a person designated by the hospital shall ask each pa-
tient who is at least [ 18] years of age: "Are you an organ or 
tissue donor?" If the answer is affirmative, the person shall re-
quest a copy of the document of gift. If the answer is negative or 
there is no answer and the attending physician consents, the per-
son designated shall discuss with the patient the option to make 
or refuse to make an anatomical gift. The answer to the ques-
tion, an available copy of any document of gift or refusal to 
make an anatomical gift, and any other relevant information, 
must be placed in the patient's medical record. 
(b) If, at or near the time of death of a patient, there is no medical 
record that the patient has made or refused to make an anatomi-
cal gift, the hospital [administrator] or a representative desig-
nated by the [administrator] shall discuss the option to make or 
refuse to make an anatomical gift and request the making of an 
anatomical gift pursuant to Section 3(a). The request must be 
made with reasonable discretion and sensitivity to the circum-
stances of the family. A request is not required if the gift is not 
suitable, based upon acceptable medical standards, for a purpose 
specified in Section 6. An entry must be made in the medical 
record of the patient, stating the name and affiliation of the indi-
vidual making the request, and of the name, response, and rela-
tionship to the patient of the person to whom the request was 
made. The [Commissioner of Health] shall [establish guide-
lines][ adopt regulations] to implement this subsection. 
(c) The following persons shall make a reasonable search for a doc-
ument of gift or other information identifying the bearer as a 
donor or as an individual who refused to make an anatomical 
gift: 
(1) a law enforcement officer, fireman, paramedic, or other 
emergency rescuer finding an individual who the searcher 
believes is dead or near death; and 
(2) a hospital, upon the admission of an individual at or near 
the section wa; deleted by amendment prior to passage. Comparf 1989 Nev. Stat. 226, § 7, p. 2 
(filed Feb. 16, 1989), Nev. Leg. Serv. (4/15/89), with 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, § 7, p. 2, Nev. Leg. 
Serv. (A.B. 226, as enacted, states that § 7 was deleted by amendment). 
106. N.D. CENT. Com:§ 23-06.2-04 (Supp. 1989). 
416 B.Y.U. JOURNAL OF PUBLIC LAW [Volume 4 
the time of death, if there is not immediately available any 
other source of that information. 
(d) If a document of gift or evidence of refusal to make an anatomi-
cal gift is located by the search required by subsection (c)(l), 
and the individual or body to whom it relates is taken to a hos-
pital, the hospital must be notified of the contents and the docu-
ment or other evidence must be sent to the hospital. 
(e) If, at or near the time of death of a patient, a hospital knows 
that an anatomical gift has been made pursuant to Section 3(a) 
or a release and removal of a part has been permitted pursuant 
to Section 4, or that a patient or an individual identified as in 
transit to the hospital is a donor, the hospital shall notify the 
donee if one is named and known to the hospital; if not, it shall 
notify an appropriate procurement organization. The hospital 
shall cooperate in the implementation of the anatomical gift or 
release and removal of a part. 
(f) A person who fails to discharge the duties imposed by this sec-
tion is not subject to criminal or civil liability but is subject to 
appropriate administrative sanctions. 
This section is an addition to the 1968 Act. Section 5 of the 1987 
Act incorporates a two-step version of the "routine inquiry /required 
request" laws passed by almost all of the states, since 1985. 107 Section 
5(a) asks an incoming patient whether he/she is already a donor. If the 
answer is affirmative, it negates the need for additional inquiry of the 
patient's family. However, if a person answers no, and only if the at-
tending physician consents, can the matter be further discussed. Section 
5(a) imposes a routine question to be asked of every patient upon ad-
mission. The Comment to Section 5 states that although it "is limited to 
the admission process of hospitals, doctors are encouraged to include a 
similar routine inquiry of patients in their office procedures and hospi-
tals are encouraged to extend the routine inquiry to outpatient, emer-
gency, minor surgery, and similar procedures that do not require ad-
mission to the hospital."108 
Section 5(b) is a uniform culmination of the already existing "re-
quired request" state laws, which direct inquiry to the family, if the 
decedent is not already a donor. 109 
Section 5(c) imposes a duty upon rescue and emergency care per-
sonnel to be on the look out for potential donors and to locate any 
107. There are 43 states that have such legislation, as well as the District of Columbia. Sff 
also supra notes 11 & 14 and accompanying text. 
108. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 5 comment. 
109. Sff supra note 107. 
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evidence that a person either is or is not a donor. 110 
As the Comment to Section S(e) points out, there is a trend and a 
need to implement procedures for working with procurement 
agencies. 111 
Section 5(f) eliminates any civil or criminal liability for the duties 
imposed by "routine inquiry," which is probably superfluous because 
of the broad immunity granted in Section 11 (c) of the 1987 Act. Also, 
administrative sanctions may be imposed for the failure of rescue per-
sonnel to comply with Section 5, and these potential sanctions offer 
enforcement. 
Of the eight states that have adopted the 1987 UAGA, only Con-
necticut retained Section 5(a), although Hawaii adopted a diluted ver-
sion of the section. The remaining subsections in Section 5 have been 
generally enacted by the adopting states. 
b. State adoptions of Section Five: 
Arkansas: Arkansas omits the routine inquiry provision upon hos-
pital admission in Section S(a). Also, the last sentence in Section S(b) 
that gives the health commissioner authority to implement the protocol 
is eliminated. The remainder of the section is adopted verbatim by 
Arkansas. 112 
California: California also omits Section S(a). 113 Instead of adopt-
ing the 1987 Act version of "routine inquiry" in Section 5(b), Califor-
nia simply refers to its present routine inquiry statute. 114 
Except for the equivalent Section 5( c)( 1 ), where California has 
eliminated the additional references to the "fireman, paramedic, or 
other emergency rescuer," California has adopted the remainder of Sec-
tion 5 of the 1987 Act. m 
Connecticut: The only change in Connecticut's section is the omis-
sion of the last sentence in Section S(b), which provides for the appro-
priate official to implement rules for the protocol; however, another sec-
II 0. Section 5(c) is based upon the Uniform Duties to Disabled Persons, which requires the 
communication of the existence of a condition requiring special treatment. ,1987 U/1.GA, supra 
note 6, at § 5(c) comment. 
Ill. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 5(e) comment. Sn alw mfra, 1987 UAGA, supra note 
6, at § 9. 
!12. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 20-17-605 (Supp. !989). 
113. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 7152.5 (Deering Supp. !989). 
114. !d. at§ 7184, as mnmdrd. The required request law was amended to attain compli-
ance with the Federal law. Srr supra note 14 and accompanying text. California's act requires a 
protocol for identifying and requesting potential donors to consent to an anatomical gift as a condi-
tion precedent to participating in Medi-Cal. !d. at § 7184(b). 
115. !d. at § 7152.5(b)-(e). 
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tion specifically grants such authority. 116 
Hawaii: Although Hawaii substantially adopts the highlights of 
Section 5, there are some changes. In its equivalent to Section S(a), 
Hawaii adopts routine inquiry upon hospital admission, but stops short 
of specifying a follow up discussion procedure if the patient is not a 
donor. Thus, regardless of whether the patient is a donor, the hospital 
is only required to furnish "basic information regarding the option to 
make or refuse to make an anatomical gift."117 
The equivalent to Section S(c) directs emergency personnel to 
search for donor card information "if time and resources permit, and if 
doing so would be inoffensive to anyone in the vicinity of the body." 118 
Idaho: Idaho has adopted Sections S(b)-(f) verbatim but has omit-
ted the routine inquiry upon hospital admission of Section S(a) of the 
1987 Act.119 
Montana: Although Section S(a) was proposed in Montana's Sen-
ate Bill 204, the routine inquiry upon hospital admission section was 
not finally adopted.120 The remainder of Sections S(b)-(f) has been sub-
stantially adopted by Montana. Montana has also added one other ex-
ception to requiring a request to the family in its version of Section 
S(b). "[I]f there are medical or emotional conditions under which the 
request would contribute to severe emotional distress,"121 then the re-
quest is exempted. 
Nevada: Nevada has omitted the parallel of Section S(a) of the 
1987 Act. Nevada has not adopted the language of Section S(b) of the 
1987 Act, but Nevada's existing "routine inquiry" law is similar in 
result to Section 5(b). 122 Nevada has substantially adopted Sections 
S(c)-(f) of the 1987 Act. 123 
North Dakota: North Dakota has omitted Section S(a) of the 1987 
116. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279e. (Supp. 1989). Section 19a-2791 grants to the "commis-
sioner of health services" the authority to adopt regulations. /d. 
117. HAw. REv. STAT.§ 327-S(a) (Supp. 1989). 
118. /d. at § 327-S(c). 
119. IDAHO CoDE § 39-3406 (Supp. 1989). 
120. Cumparf S. 204, 51st Leg., Reg. Sess., § 13 (originally including Section 5(a) of the 
1987 UAGA), u·ith 1989 Mont. Laws 540, § 13, (enacted without Section 5(a) of the 1987 
UAGA). 
121. 1989 Mont. Laws 540, § 13. 
122. NF:V. REv. STAT. § 451.577 (Supp. 1989). Nevada's existing protocol requires that a 
request to donate be made in order of the priority classes. Nevada's routine inquiry law also 
requires taking into account the person's "religious and cultural beliefs." /d. at§ 451.577 !.(b)(!). 
Part of the required protocol can also be interpreted to allow a hospital to make routine 
inquiries of patients at the time of ~dmission to the hospital, thus being similar to Section S(a) of 
the 1987 Act. "The policies and procedures must require the administrator of the hospital or his 
representative: (!.) To determine whether a person is a donor. ." /d. at § 451.577 !.(a). 
123. /d. at § 451.577 2.-5. 
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Act. Although the North Dakota version of Section S(b) is similar in 
result to the 1987 Act, North Dakota has essentially enacted an indi-
vidual "routine inquiry" act. 124 North Dakota has adopted verswns 
substantially similar to Sections 5( c)-(f) of the 1987 Act.m 
6. Section Six of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Persons Who May Become Donees; Purposes for Which Ana-
tomical Gifts may be Made: 
(a) The following persons may become donees of anatomical gifts 
for the purposes stated: 
(1) a hospital, physician, surgeon, or procurement organization, 
for transplantation, therapy, medical or dental education, 
research, or advancement of medical or dental science; 
(2) an accredited medical or dental school, college, or university 
for education, research, advancement of medical or dental 
science; or 
(3) a designated individual for transplantation or therapy 
needed by that individual. 
(b) An anatomical gift may be made to a designated donee or with-
out designating a donee. If a donee is not designated or if the 
donee is not available or rejects the anatomical gift, the anatomi-
cal gift may be accepted by any hospital. 
(c) If the donee knows of the decedent's refusal or contrary indica-
tions to make an anatomical gift or that an anatomical gift by a 
member of a class having priority to act is opposed by a member 
of the same class or a prior class under Section 3(a), the donee 
may not accept the anatomical gift. 
Section 6 specifies a list of potential donees and purposes, empha-
sizing that the purpose of transplantation is primary .126 The section is 
merely a rearrangement of various sections in the 1968 Act. 127 
124. N.D. CF.NT. ConF. § 23-06.2-05.1.-3 (Supp. 1989). North Dakota had adopted a rou-
tine inquiry law in 1987; the law specifies that the family in order of the priority list must be 
asked to donate according to the hospital protocol. The person who does the requesting must not 
be "connected with the determination of death." !d. at § 23-06.2-05.1. Ther~ are two specifically 
authorized exceptions to requiring a request to donate: nonsuitability based upon medical criteria 
and the "attending physician's special and peculiar knowledge of the decedent or the circumstances 
surrounding the death" allow the physician to dictate that a request will not be made. ld. at § 23-
06.2-05.2. & 3. 
125. ld. at § 23-06.2-05.4.-7. 
126. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at§ 6 comment. Naming one's donee is certainly a personal 
prerogative, but there is also a potential problem of discrimination when the donor has made such 
an indication. 
127. Sections 3, 4(c), & 2(c) of the 1968 UAGA, supra note 2. 
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b. State adoptions of Section Six: 
Arkansas: Arkansas has adopted the parallel of Section 6 of the 
1987 Act. 128 
California: The California equivalent section is identical to the 
1987 Act, except that it adds as a potential donee (in the case of pace-
makers) "a person who reconditions pacemakers."129 
Connecticut: The parallel section has been adopted m 
Connecticut. 130 
Hawaii: The Hawaii counterpart is identical to Section 6 of the 
1987 Act. 131 
Idaho: Idaho has adopted the equivalent of Section 6, but a pre-
requisite is added. "[P]arts for transplantation shall not be transplanted 
or transfused under any conditions unless accompanied by a medical 
certificate which states that the part comes from a person who has been 
tested for HIV antibodies or antigens, and that the test is negative for 
the presence of HIV antibodies or antigens." 132 
Montana: The Montana law is substantially similar. 133 
Nevada: Nevada's act is substantially similar to the 1987 Act. 134 
North Dakota: The law in North Dakota is substantially similar 
to the 1 987 Act. 1311 
7. Section Sez,en of the 1987 UAGA 
r1. Drliz'er)' of Document of Gift: 
(a) Delivery of a document of gift during the donor's lifetime is not 
required for the validity of an anatomical gift. 
(b) If an anatomical gift is made to a designated donee, the docu-
ment of gift, or a copy, may be delivered to the donee to expedite 
the appropriate procedures after death. The document of gift, or 
a copy, may be deposited in any hospital, procurement organiza-
tion, or registry office that accepts it for safekeeping or for facili-
tation of procedures after death. On request of an interested per-
son, upon or after the donor's death, the person in possession 
128. ARK STAT. ANN. § 20-17-606 (Supp. 1989). 
129. CAL HEALTH & SAFETY Coin:§ 7153(b)(4) (Deering Supp. 1989). 
1 :>o. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279f. (Supp. 1989). 
131 HAw. REv. STAT. § 327-6 (Supp. 1989). 
132. IDAHO Com:§ 39-3407(1) (Supp. 1989). Srr supm note 36 and infra note 1.51. 
133. MoNT. Com: ANN. § 72-17-202 (Supp. 1989). 
134. NEv. REv. STAT. § 451.560 (Supp. 1989). 
135. N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 23-06.2-06 (Supp. 1989). An educational institution may also be a 
donrr for the added purpose of "therapy," which is not included in the 1987 Art. /d. at §§ 23-
06.2 to -lll>.l.b. 
395] UNIFORM ANATOMICAL GIFT ACT 421 
shall allow the interested person to examine or copy the docu-
ment of gift. 
Section 7 does not substantially change the 1968 UAGA. 136 Sec-
tion 7 specifies that delivery of the anatomical gift document is not nec-
essary to make the gift effective and that the document may, but need 
not, be recorded. 137 An "interested person" must be given a copy of any 
recorded anatomical gift document, but neither the 1968 nor the 1987 
Act defines who is an "interested person." In reality, since the docu-
ment is much like a will, which can be read and/or copied by practi-
cally anyone, there should not and there has not been any published 
concern for this provision. 
b. State adoptions of Section Seven: 
Arkansas: The Arkansas counterparts are verbatim. 138 
California: The California equivalent sections are parallel.139 
Connecticut: The Connecticut parallel sections are verbatim. 140 
Hawaii: Hawaii's provisions are parallel. 141 
Idaho: The Idaho section is identical to Section 7 of the 1987 
Act.I42 
Montana: The Montana provision is substantially similar. 143 
Nevada: Nevada has limited the access to the document of gift to 
the priority members, otherwise the remainder is unchanged by adop-
tion of the section. 144 
North Dakota: The North Dakota equivalent sections are substan-
tially similar .1411 
8. Section Eight of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Rights and Duties at Death: 
(a) Rights of a donee created by an anatomical gift are superior to 
rights of others except with respect to autopsies under Section 
136. Section 7 of the 1987 lJAGA is a combination of Sections 4(b) and 5 of thr 1968 ;\r-t 
137. A document of gift should >ll'l'fr be required to be filed in order to be effective; the 
organ donation laws would be defeated by such a requirement. 
138. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-607 (Supp. 1989). 
139. CAt.. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 7153.5 (Deering Supp. 1989). 
140. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279g. (Supp. 1989). 
141. HAw. REv. STAT. § 327-7 (Supp. 1989). 
142. IDAHO ConE § 39-3408 (Supp. 1989). 
143. MoNT. Com: ANN.§ 72-17-208 (Supp. 1989), as mnmdrd by 1989 Mont. Laws 540, 
§ 7. 
144. NEV. REV. STAT. § 451.570 (Supp. 1989). 
145. N.D. CENT. Com. § 23-06.2-07 (Supp. 1989). 
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ll(b). A donee may accept or reject an anatomical gift. If a do-
nee accepts an anatomical gift of an entire body, the donee, sub-
ject to the terms of the gift, may allow embalming and use of the 
body in funeral services. If the gift is of a part of a body, the 
donee, upon the death of the donor and before embalming, shall 
cause the part to be removed without unnecessary mutilation. 
After removal of the part, the custody of the remainder of the 
body vests in the person under obligation to dispose of the body. 
(b) The time of death must be determined by a physician or surgeon 
who attends the donor at death or, if none, the physician or sur-
geon who certifies the death. Neither the physician or surgeon 
who attends the donor at death nor the physician or surgeon 
who determines the time of death may participate in the proce-
dures for removing or transplanting a part unless the document 
of gift designates a particular physician or surgeon pursuant to 
Section 2(d). 
(c) If there has been an anatomical gift, a technician may remove 
any donated parts and an enucleator may remove any donated 
eyes or parts of eyes, after determination of death by a physician 
or surgeon. 
Section 8 does not depart from the 1968 UAGA. 146 It sets out the 
rights of donees, who have priority to the body over everyone else, un-
less an autopsy is necessary. Like the 1968 Act, a specified donee is 
entitled to remove the anatomical gift, without unnecessary mutilation, 
and then deliver the body to the appropriate kin for burial. Also, the 
transplant physician and the attending physician must maintain their 
separate responsibilities to avoid the appearance of a conflict of interest. 
b. State adoptions of Section Eight: 
Arkansas: The Arkansas provision is substantially similar to the 
1987 Act. 147 
California: California adds references to a pacemaker; otherwise, 
the comparable section is identical to the 1987 Act. 148 
Connecticut: Connecticut's version of Section 8(a) is identical to 
the 1987 Act. However, Connecticut modifies Section 8(b) and omits 
Section 8(c). In the equivalent to Section 8(b), Connecticut defines 
"death," then specifically requires death to be determined by two 
physicians. 149 
146. The section is a combination of Sections 2(e) and 7(a) & (b) of the 1968 UAGA. 
147. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 20-17-606 (Supp. 1989). 
148. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY Coo£§ 7154 (Deering Supp. 1989). 
149. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279h.(b) (Supp. 1989). 
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Hawaii: Hawaii's parallel section is identical to Section 8 of the 
1987 Act. 150 
Idaho: The comparable section in Idaho is substantially similar to 
the 1987 Act, except that a donee may not accept a gift until it has first 
been tested and certified to be suitable. 151 
Montana: The parallel section is identical to the 1987 Act. 152 
Nevada: The parallel section is identical to the 1987 Act. 153 
North Dakota: The comparable section is substantially similar to 
the 1987 Act. 154 
9. Section Nine of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Coordination of Procurement and Use: 
Each hospital in this State, after consultation with other hospitals and 
procurement organizations, shall establish agreements or affiliations 
for coordination of procurement and use of human bodies and parts. 
Although this section is an addition to the 1968 Act, it is similar to 
the provisions found in many of the "required request/routine inquiry" 
laws. 155 
b. State adoptions of Section Nine: 
Arkansas: The comparable section in Arkansas is identical to the 
1987 Act.156 
California: The comparable California section is identical to the 
1987 Act. 157 
§ 8. 
Connecticut: The Connecticut version is identical. 158 
Hawaii: The Hawaii version is identicaJ.l59 
Idaho: Idaho adopts the section in its entirety .160 
Montana: Montana's comparable version is identical to the 1987 
150. 
151. 
152. 
153. 
154. 
HAW. REv. STAT. § 327-8 (Supp. 1989). 
IDAHO CoDE § 39-3409(1) (Supp. 1989) (citing § 39-2307); see supra notes 36 & 132. 
MoNT. CoDE ANN.§ 72-17-301 (Supp. 1989), as amended by 19~9 Mont. Laws 540, 
NEV. Rt:v. STAT. § 451.580 (Supp. 1989), as amended by 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, § 26. 
N.D. CENT. Com: § 23-06.2-08 (Supp. 1989). 
155. See Sipes, supra note 9, nn.1 04-12 and accompanying text (citing examples of routine 
inquiry laws). See a/.1o 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 9 comment. 
156. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 20-17-609 (Supp. 1989). 
157. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE § 7154.5 (Deering Supp. 1989). 
158. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279i. (Supp. 1989). 
159. HAW. REv. STAT. 327-9 (Supp. 1989). 
160. IDAHO CoDE§ 39-3410 (Supp. 1989). 
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Act.1a1 
Nevada: Nevada adopts the section in its entirety. 162 
North Dakota: North Dakota is substantially similar. 163 
10. Section Ten of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Sale or Purchase of Parts Prohibited: 
(a) A person may not knowingly, for valuable consideration, 
purchase or sell a part for transplantation or therapy, if removal 
of the part is intended to occur after the death of the decedent. 
(b) Valuable consideration does not include reasonable payment for 
the removal, processing, disposal, preservation, quality control, 
storage, transportation, or implantation of a part. 
(c) A person who violates this section is guilty of a [felony] and 
upon conviction is subject to a fine not exceeding [$50,000] or 
imprisonment not exceeding [five] years, or both. 
Although this section is an altogether new addition to the 1987 
Act, many states have a similar provision. The federal law enacted in 
1984 makes selling and buying organs illegal. 164 
b. State adoptions of Section Ten: 
Arkansas: Arkansas' comparable proviSion IS substantially 
similar. 1611 
California: The parallel section in California is very similar. 166 
Connecticut: The section adopted by Connecticut differs from the 
1987 Act, but the result is substantially similar. 167 
161. 1989 Mont. Laws 540, § 14. 
162. 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, § 8. 
163. N.D. CENT. CODE§ 23-06.2-09 (Supp. 1989). 
164. National Transplant Act, 42 U.S.C. § 274e (Supp. 1989). The Act makes it unlawful to 
trade in human organs for "valuable consideration." /d. "Valuable consideration" does not include 
"reasonable payments associated with the removal, transportation, implantation, processing, pres-
ervation, quality control, and storage of a human organ or the expenses in travel, housing, and lost 
wages" for a donor. Sipes, Hmlth Progress, supra note 8, at 47. The idea of a "black market" in 
organs has been considered to be repellent. /d. at 50; Quay, supra note 64, at 895 n.28. 
Massachusetts had an early law that prohibited organ sales. Sadler & Sadler, .\Upra note 64, 
at 391 n.110. 
165. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 20-17-610 (Supp. 1989). The Arkansas provision makes it a Class 
C felony. /d. at § 61 O(c). 
166. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE§ 7155 (Deering Supp. 1989). The term of imprison-
ment is "three, five, or seven years." /d. 
167. CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-280a (Supp. 1989). The definition for "valuable considera-
tion" is broader and more liberal than the 1987 Act version. 
"Valuable consideration" does not include (A) a fee paid to a physician or to other 
medical personnel for services rendered in the usual course of medical practice or a fee 
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Hawaii: Hawaii's comparable section is identical to Section 10 of 
the 1987 Act. 168 
Idaho: The parallel section in Idaho is identical to Section 1 0 of 
the 1987 Act. 169 
Montana: The Montana section is identical.170 
Nevada: The Nevada section is the same as Section 10 of the 1987 
Act.171 
North Dakota: North Dakota's comparable section is similar to 
Section 10 of the 1987 Act, but the offense is a misdemeanor. 172 
11. Section Eleven of the 1987 UAGA 
a. Examination, Autopsy, Liability: 
(a) An anatomical gift authorizes any reasonable examination neces-
sary to assure medical acceptability of the gift for the purposes 
intended. 
(b) The provisions of this [Act] are subject to the laws of this State 
governing autopsies. 
(c) A hospital, physician, surgeon, [coroner], [medical examiner], 
[local public health officer], enucleator, technician, or other per-
son, who acts in accordance with this [Act] or with the applica-
ble anatomical gift law of another state [or foreign country] or 
attempts in good faith to do so is not liable for that act in a civil 
action or criminal proceeding. 
(d) An individual who makes an anatomical gift pursuant to Section 
2 or 3 and the individual's estate are not liable for any injury or 
damage that may result from the making or the use of the ana-
tomical gift. 
Section 11 is almost identical to the 1968 Act. 173 The 1987 Act 
adds the phrase "attempts in good faith" which provides more protec-
tion from potential liability by allowing actions, as well as attempts, to 
paid for hospital or other clinical services; (B) reimbursement of legal or medical ex-
penses incurred for the benefit of the ultimate receiver of the organ; or (C) reimburse-
ment of expenses of travel, housing and lost wages incurred by the donor of a human 
organ in connection with the donation of the organ. 
!d. at § 19a-280a(a)(2). The Connecticut act is very similar to the National Transplant Act, 
supra note 164. 
168. HAw. REv. STAT.§ 327-10 (Supp. 1989). 
169. IDAHO CoDE § 39-3410 (Supp. 1989). 
170. 1989 Mont. Laws 450, § 15. 
171. 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, § 10. 
172. N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 23-06.2-10 (Supp. 1989). 
173. Sections 11(a)-(c) are derived from former sections of the original act; Section 11(a) is 
former Section 2(d), and Sections (b)-(c) are former Sections 7(d) and 7(c), respectively. 
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be covered. 174' Section (d) enlarges immunity protection by specifically 
protecting the donor's estate from liability. 
b. State adoptions of Section Eleven: 
Arkansas: The parallel provision in Arkansas is identical. 175 
California: California has added a requirement that "[a]ll donors 
shall be screened for infectious diseases. " 176 
Connecticut: Connecticut's comparable version is substantially 
similar to the 1987 Act. 177 
Hawaii: The parallel section in Hawaii is identical to Section 11 
of the 1987 Act. 178 
Idaho: The Idaho section is identical to the 1987 Act's version. 179 
Montana: The section is substantially similar, and Montana spe-
cifically adds nurses to the list of personnel entitled to immunity.180 
Nevada: Nevada's version is similar to the 1987 Act, but immunity 
is only specifically granted to those who act in accordance with Nevada 
laws, instead of in accordance with any other state or foreign coun-
try.181 Nevada did not adopt Section 11(b); however, the operative lan-
guage, subjecting the RUAGA to autopsy laws, is adopted in another 
section. 182 
North Dakota: The section is substantially similar to the 1987 
Act.1sa 
The remaining Sections 12-17 are procedural sections for incorpo-
rating a new statute.184 
Ill. OVERVIEW 
A. Acceptance of the 1987 UAGA 
There are four probable reasons for the lack of a positive attitude 
towards enacting the 1987 UAGA, when compared to the unammous 
174. 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, at § 11(c) comment. 
175. ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 20-17-611 (Supp. 1989). 
176. CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CoDE§ 7155.5(a) (Deering Supp. 1989). 
177. CONN. GEN. STAT. § 19a-279j (Supp. 1989). 
178. HAw. REv. STAT.§ 327-11 (Supp. 1989). 
179. IDAHO CODE § 39-3412 (Supp. 1989). 
180. MoNT. CoDE ANN. § 72-17-207 (Supp. 1989). 
181. 1989 Nev. Stat. 200, § 10. 
182. /d. at § 27 (to be codified at NEv. REv. STAT. § 451.585). 
183. N.D. CENT. CoDE§ 23-06.2-11 (Supp. 1989). 
184. These sections relate to the transition of a subsequently executed anatomical gift (Sec-
tion 12); uniformity in interpretation (Section 13); severability of the sections (Section 14); the title 
(Section 15); repeals (Section 16); and the effective date (Section 17). 1987 UAGA, supra note 6, 
§§ 12-17. 
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popularity of the 1968 UAGA. The first reason is that the 1987 
UAGA is not needed as vitally as the 1968 UAGA was when it was 
proposed. Prior to 1968, the states had a variety of statutes that author-
ized donations in a confusing array. 1811 The 1968 UAGA was a wel-
come solution to the donation problems, and it also offered a uniform 
immunity clause. 186 
Another reason that the 1987 UAGA is not as necessary as a uni-
form law is that it is not significantly different from the 1968 UAGA, 
with the exception of Section S(a). The majority of the 1987 UAGA 
only clarifies certain areas, but Sections 4 and S(a) present concepts 
that do not represent uniform state interests. 
Lack of acceptance of the 1987 UAGA may be attributed to the 
number of existing statutes that must be reviewed to avoid a conflict 
with the 1987 UAGA. As the states have been busy with donation leg-
islation since early 1985, the legislatures may be understandably slug-
gish in analyzing the potential impact of the 1987 UAGA. 
There has been general acceptance of the 1987 UAGA by the 
adopting states, except for Sections 4 and S(a). Thus, analyzing the 
historical sources, as well as the effects, of Sections 4 and S(a) may 
provide insight into the future acceptability of the 1987 UAGA. 
1. Section Four 
Section 4 specifies that coroners/medical examiners are the last of 
the three ranking groups able to make anatomical gifts. The first donor 
group is the individual himself; the second group is the family, accord-
ing to a further ranking of members. Section 4 has been generally ac-
ceptable to the eight states that have enacted it, except to Connecticut 
and Nevada. 
There are two possible areas for objections to Section 4. The first 
is an official's potential power to give parts without the family's knowl-
edge. The second is the origin of that official's power. 
The section does not, of course, permit the official to make a dona-
tion without compliance with the necessary prerequisites. Furthermore, 
the official's power is last in the hierarchy. Although Section 4 is not a 
pure "presumed consent" provision, it does, however, allow the official 
to make a gift without family knowledge or consent if there is no family 
185. Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 401-02; Dukeminier, supra note 2, at 817; 
Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, supra note 2, at 1185; Note, Lrgal Problnns in Dona tum 
of Human Tissues to Mrdical Science, supra note 2, at 356-57; Comment, Proprrty in Corp,rs, 
supra note 79, at 280-93; Note, The Law of Drad Bodies: Impeding Medical Progrrs.1, supra 
note 78, at 456-59. 
186. Note, The Sale of Human Body Parts, supra note 2, at 1186. 
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"available" and the required "reasonable search" has been 
unsuccessful. 187 
The comment to Section 4 reveals a preference for "presumed con-
sent" procedures, but only when the family is not "available."188 On 
the other hand, the Task Force specifically recommended that if an 
official, such as the coroner, is given the power to donate, that the 
power should be only with the consent of the family. 189 Section 4 does 
not follow the Task Force's philosophy, since it does permit the official 
to donate, without family consent, after an unsuccessful search. 
The origin of presumed consent statutes can probably be traced to 
the "unclaimed body statutes." In the late eighteenth century, the medi-
cal need for cadavers exceeded the supply. Because of medical schools 
purchasing cadavers, "grave robbing" became a prevalent profession. 190 
The English Anatomy Act of 1832 was enacted to allow schools to re-
ceive the bodies of paupers and the unclaimed. 191 American anatomy 
acts followed soon thereafter. These "unclaimed body" statutes are also 
referred to as "anatomy" statutes and vest authority in coroners to de-
liver unclaimed bodies to medical schools for research and dissection. 192 
a. Removal statutes. There are currently two types of presumed 
consent or removal statutes: quasi, which require a search, but no con-
187. There is an issue about the interpretation of "consent" or "absence of objection." The 
problem is that a coroner may be able to authorize removal if there is no objection; this, however, 
does not require the coroner to search actively for the relatives first. It is obvious that if the 
coroner has no prior relationship, he will have no "knowledge" until he does perform a search or 
locates the next of kin. 
In several states, there are statutes authorizing the medical examiner to remove eyes or 
corneal tissue under specified circumstances . . There is a variation among existing 
statutes in the requirement to inform or seek consent of next of kin before organs or 
tissues are removed. In several states, including Georgia and Florida, there is no re-
quirement to inform or seek consent if the other conditions prescribed by statute are 
satisfied. In others, information and consent are required. 
1987 UAGA, 1ujm1 note 6, at § 4 comment. 
!d. 
188. However, the search may be ignored if the useful life of the organ is in jeopardy. 
Subsection (a)(2) seeks to balance societal and family interests, that is, to increase the 
size of the donor pool and to give the family the opportunity to make or refuse to make 
an anatomical gift. The balance . . is on the side of increasing the size of the donor 
pool. The duty . . to inform next of kin is limited to "a reasonable effort taking into 
account the useful life of the part .... " 
189. Task Force Report, .1upra note 9, at 30-31. 
190. Comment, Propaty in Corpses, supra note 79, at 294. 
191. Dukeminier, .\Upra note 2, at 811 n.2; Note, The Law of Dnul Bodies: Impedin/2: .Hnli-
cal Prof2:rP.\s, sufna note 78, at 455. 
192. Sadler & Sadler, supra note 64, 13-15; Sanders & Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 395, 
403; Comment, ProjJtrty in Corpses, supra note 79, at 294-95; Note, The Law of Dead Bodies: 
Impedin/2: Mediml Prol!ress, supra note 78, at 455, 459; Note, Lef2:al Problems in Donation of 
Human Tissue to Mnlical Sciena, supra note 2, at 354-56. 
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sent, if the search is unsuccessful; and pure, which require no search 
and no consent of the family. 193 Although, the presumed consent stat-
utes have generally been limited to harvesting corneas and pituitary 
glands, these "presumed consent" statutes have also been the subject of 
recent consitutional challenges. 194 
The quasi type of removal statutes are similar to Section 4 of the 
1987 UAGA because a search is first required. There are thirteen 
states with quasi statutes. There are seven that specifically refer to eye/ 
corneal tissue removal and five statutes to pituitary gland removal. 195 
193. There are several statutes that do require consent. They are probably superfluous be-
cause of the UAGA; however, the idea underlying the statutes is recognizable. The statuU's pro-
mote coroners' involvement, a lack of which has been cited as a barrier to donations. SN •ujlro 
note KO; SPP, r p;., CALIF. Gov'T Com: § 27 491.44 (Deerinf!; Supp. 1989). 
For eye enucleations, see CoLo. REv. STAr.§ 30-10-620 (Supp. 1986); IND. Com ANN.§ 
29-2-16-4 (Burns 1972 & Supp. 1988); MINN. STAT. ANN.§ 525.924 (West 1975). 
For other statutes that require consent and allow for more than eye/corneal n'moval, see 
D.C:. Com ANN.§ 11-2313 (Supp. 1989) (allowing tissue removal); NEll. RFv. StAt § 71-4813 
(Supp. 1988) (allowing eye ti"ue and pituitary gland removal). At one time, the Nebraska statute 
was a pure presumed mnsent statute. Srr Note, Thr Salt of f111man Bod)· l'ar/.1, 111jn11 note 2, at 
1212 & n.217; N.Y. Pull. HEALTH§ 4222 (McKinney 1985 & Supp. 1989) (allowing removal of 
corneal tissue and pituitary gland); TEX. REv. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 4590-(, (Vernon .~upp. 1989) 
(allowing removal ol visceral organs); VA. Com: ANN. § 32.1-287 (19K5) (organs, c\Ts, tissues, 
and glands, other than the pituitary which may be removed without consent). 
194. Apparently, the common practice of harvesting pituitary gland" fmrn dead hodit·s with-
out the family's consent spawned a public outcry in the 1960s to en:trt legislation to prevent 
unauthorized recovery. Caplan & Bayer, wjlra note 10, at 10 (citing Sadler & Sadler .. \ C:oo/11111· 
nit\ of Gi<•fn, Sot Takrn, THF HASTINc;s CENTF:R REPOR r, 14, 5 pp. 6-9) (discussing reports 
from C.difornia and Minnesota when pituitary glands had been removed without family comem) 
Srt 1111o Note, Thr /.au• of Dl'!ul Bodin: lmjltding Mtdiml Prop;rt.IS, 111jna note 7~. at 465; 
Sadler & Sadler. 1UjJra note 64, at 14-15. 
195. The seven eyeicorne.t corne3l tissue removal statutes are: ARIZ. REV. S txt .\'>'>. § 
36.HS1 (Supp. 1'!88); ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 110 >2, para. :151-354 (Smith-Hurd .~upp. 1989) 
(under former law, permission was required; the Illinois Corneal Transplant Act was amended in 
198\ effective 19H7, to delete the requirement of permission and to add conditions of a "good faith 
effort" to locate the next of kin. 198' Ill. Laws 85-192); LA. RFV. STAT. A"K. § 21'4. I IWe>t 
19k2) (.\t first glance, Louisiana's removal statutes may appear to he "pure" presumed ('(;nsent; 
however, when § 2354.1 is read in conjunction with T. 33, § 1565 B.(3), they clearlv require that 
the parish wroner first make a good faith effort to locate the kin. LA. Ctv. ConF. ANN. art. T 33 
§ 1565 B (3) (West 1982)); !'vi Ass. ANN. LAWS ch. 113 § 14 (Law. Co-op 1988); I\ !Iss. Cnm: 
:\t-;N. § 41-61-71 (Supp. 1989) Comparr TFNl\. Com Al\N. § AS-30-201 (1987) (which requires 
consent under certain circumstances) u•ith § 68-30-204 (Supp. 1988) (which does not require fam-
ily consent or search under certain circumstances); WASH. REv. CoDE ANN. § 68.50.280 (Supp. 
1989) ! § 68.50.2'JIJ provides an exceedingly protective immunity clause). 
The five pituitarv gland removal statutes are: ARK. STAT. ANN.§ 12-12-30 (19K7) l;tt first 
glance, the Arkansas statute would appear to be a pure presumed consent, however, ~ 21!-1 ~ · 70!. 
requires that the person who has custody of the hody must try to locate the next of kin. Thus, a 
medical examiner authorizing removal of the pituitary gland under § 12-12-30 would be "'bJcCt to 
a required search. /d. § 20-17-702 (1987)); Miss. Com: ANN.§ 41-61-71 (Supp. i')8'J); TtN,_, 
Com. ANN § 68-10-301 (1987); VA. Com §§ 32.1- 283 & .'\2.1-287 (1985) (Ste Note, Thr Snit 
of H111110 11 Body Po r/.1, ;ujno note 2, at 1212-13 (discussing Virginia's carlicl nonccn1>ensual 
removal statute); naord Dukeminirr, sujJm note 2, at 843; Sadler & .~adler . . 1ujim note <>4, at 
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A representative quasi-type removal statute reads: 
(1) A medical examiner shall request the available next of kin of a 
decedent, as provided in applicable state law, for their permis-
sion to obtaining corneal tissue, pituitaries or other tissues from 
the decedent, when the tissues would be suitable for transplant 
utilization, as outlined by the Mississippi Eye and Human Tis-
sue Bank. 
(2) A medical examiner or pathologist designated by the medical ex-
aminer may provide corneal tissue, pituitaries or other tissues 
from a decedent under the jurisdiction of the medical examiner 
or the designated pathologist, to the Mississippi Eye and 
Human Tissue Bank or other donee specified under the follow-
ing conditions: 
(a) (i) Consent from the next of kin is obtained; or 
(ii) A reasonable attempt to determine the next of kin has 
failed; or 
(iii) The medical examiner or designated pathologist be-
lieves that there are no next of kin to be contacted for 
consent; and 
(b) The removal of the tissue for transplant or therapy will 
not interfere with any subsequent course of investigation or 
autopsy or alter the post-mortem facial appearance. 
(3) If the requirements of subsection (2)(a) of this section have been 
met, neither the medical examiner, the designated pathologist, 
nor the donee shall be liable in any civil action brought by the 
next of kin on the contention that authorization of the next of 
kin was required to remove the tissues. 196 
The pure presumed consent group is found in eighteen jurisdic-
tions.197 These eighteen have nine pituitary gland removal statutes198 
15); WAsH. REv. Com: ANN. § 68.50.106 (Supp. 1989). 
There are other quasi statutes that allow the removal of mon· than corneas/eyes/corneal 
tissue/pituitary glands: CAL. Gov'T CooE § 27491.45 (Deering Supp. 1989) (body parts) (Cali-
fornia has consistently maintained a presumed consent approach. Sre Sadler & Sadler, sujna note 
64, at 16 (discussing earlier California autopsy laws); Note, Human Organ Tmn.,planta-
tion-The .\1rdiml Miracle, .1ujna note 2, at n.218 anrl accompanyin{\ text); LA. REv. STAT. 
ANN. § 2354.3 (West Supp. 1989) (heart, lungs, liver, soft tissue, or bone) & § 2354.2 (West 
1982) (kidneys); Mo. EsT. & TRUSTS Com: ANN. § 4-509 (Supp. 1989) (organs) (See Note, 
Hwnruz Organ Transplantation-Thr Mnliral Miracle, IUJna note 2. at 1212-13 (discussing 
Maryland's predecessor non consensual removal statute)); MISS. Com: ANN. § 41-61-71 (Supp. 
1989) (other tissue); TEX. Ctv. Com: ANN. art. 4590-6 (Vernon Supp. 1989) (non-visceral organs 
and other tissues); UTAH Com. ANN. § 26-4-23 (Supp. 1989) (organs and tissues). 
196. Mtss. ConE ANN.§ 41-61-71 (Supp 1989). 
197. In 1988, Kansas repealed its pure presumed mnsent statute, which allowed for removal 
of the pituitary gland. 1988 Kan. Sess. Laws 103, § 3 (repealing KAN. STAT. ANN. § 22a-233 
(Supp. 1988)). 
198. CAL Gov'T Coot:§ 27491.46 (Deerine; Supp 1989); Cow. REv. STAT. § 30-10-621 
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and thirteen eye/ corneal tissue removal types. 199 Generally, these stat-
utes allow removal if there is no known objection, if there is a request 
for transplantation, and if the official consenting to the removal has 
proper custody over the body. 
b. Rnnoval cases. Unlike any of the pituitary gland removal stat-
utes, the corneal statutes in the pure category have been the subject of 
constitutional challenges. The challenges have been futile, however, on 
the grounds that the next of kin have no property right in the body and 
that the overwhelming good of the public is at stake in allowing corneal 
removal and transplant. 
In Tillman v. Detroit Receiving Hospital, 200 a mother complained 
that her deceased daughter's eyes had been removed without her con-
sent or knowledge. However, the appeals court ruled that the Michigan 
corneal removal statute gave to the medical examiner the right to au-
thorize the removal in the absence of knowledge of any objection. There 
was no invasion of the mother's right of privacy because she had no 
right of privacy in her daughter's body. 
The second action involved a constitutional attack on the Georgia 
corneal removal statute, which is similar to the Michigan statute. In 
Georgia Lions Eye Bank, Inc. v. Lavant,201 the Georgia Supreme 
Court held that the statute was constitutional because the plaintiff had 
no property right in her deceased infant and, thus, could not complain. 
The court also pointed out that with the passage of the corneal removal 
statute, more than 1000 people had regained their eyesight. 202 
(Supp. 1986); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 19a-281 (West 1986) (formerly required permission, 
amended, 1982 Conn. Acts P.A. 82-260); MICH STAT. ANN. § 333.2855 (Callaghan 1988) (srr 
nlso § 52.205, which requires the medical examiner to make a diligent effort to locate the next of 
kin before performing an autopsy when there is a body found that apparently died a violent or 
suspicious death); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 390.36 (West Supp. 1989); Mo. Rt:v. STAT. § 58.770 
(1989); OHIO REV. ConE ANN. § 2108.53 (Baldwin 1988); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 944.1 
(West Supp. 1988); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 510 (Supp. 1989). 
199. CAL. Gov'T Com § 27491.47 (Deering Supp. 1989); CoNN. Gt:N. STAT. ANN. § 19a-
281 (West 1986) (sn supra note 198); DEL Com: ANN. tit. 29, § 4712 (Supp. 1988) (formerly 
good faith efforts to contact the next of kin were required, amended, 65 Del Laws 43 (1985); FLA. 
STAT. ANN.§ 732.9185 (West 1983); GA. ConE ANN.§ 31.23.6 (1985); KY. Rt:v. STAT. ANN.§ 
311.187 (Supp. 1988); Mo. EsT. & TRUSTS Coot: ANN.§ 4-509.1 (Supp. 1989) (specifies the 
regional allocation of the corneal tissue); MICH. STAT. ANN. § 333.10202 (Callaghan 1988) (sn 
also § 52.205, which requires the medical examiner to make a diligent effort to locate the next of 
kin before performing an autopsy when there is a body found that apparently died a violent or 
suspicious death); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 130A-391 (1984); OHIO REV. ConE ANN. § 2108.60 
(Baldwin 1988); TENN. ConE ANN. § 68-30-204 (Supp. 1988); TEX. Civ. ConE ANN. art. 4590-
4 (Vernon Supp. 1989); W.VA. ConE§ 16-19-3a (1984). 
200. 138 Mich. App. 683, 360 N.W.2d 275 (1984). 
201. 255 Ga. 60, 335 S.E.2d 127 (1985), art. dmird, 106 S. Ct. 1464 (1986). 
202. 335 S.E.2d at 128. The dissenting opinion maintained that the statute prevented the 
mother from using her right to object. !d. at 129 (dissenting opinion). 
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The latest reported constitutional attack on a pure presumed cor-
neal removal statute was in Florida.203 The case involved two com-
plaints; one in which a drowned victim's corneal tissue had been re-
moved without his parents' consent or knowledge and the other, a 
single automobile accident in which the deceased's corneal tissue had 
been removed without his parents' knowledge or consent. The Florida 
court ruled, as had the previous state courts, that the parents had no 
property right and that the statute gave the medical examiner the right 
to remove the corneal tissue without first contacting the parents. How-
ever, the Florida dissent raises the other controversial issue in Section 
4-the origin of the coroner's power to donate. That power originated 
with the "anatomy" statutes. The problem, as the Florida dissent 
points out, is that there is now a conflict with the original common law 
principle, since the enactment of the 1968 UAGA. 
When the UAGA was promulgated, it altered the traditional com-
mon law theory of property rights in dead bodies. That traditional 
common law approach dictates that the next of kin have no property 
right in the remains of a dead body. 204 In fact, no one according to the 
common law can own a body. The common law does grant to the next 
of kin the personal right of burial because the relative's right to possess 
the body for proper burial is a morally and legally recognized right. 206 
The relative's right has also been referred to as a "quasi-property" 
right, but the accepted view is that there is no property right in the 
body, rather only an obligation to dispose of the remains and thus, a 
coincidental personal right that the burial be handled properly. 206 
203. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188 (Fla.), rat. dnzin/, 107 S. Ct. 2202 (1986). A.rrurd 
Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So. 2d 682 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1988) (The associate medical 
examiner could be liable, since he harl caused removal of the eyes, even though the child's medical 
chart indicated the mother's refusal to make a donation.). 
204. Note, Hrart Transplant\: Lrgal Obstarlrs To Donation, supra note 2, at 80; Note, 
Human Organ Tran,jJ/antation-Thr Mrdirnl Mirarlr, suj;ra note 2, at 422 .. 424. 
Lord Coke has been accused of misreading the property law principle in Haynes' Case ( 12 
Coke 113, 77 Eng. Rep. 1389) (c. 1612). Note, Law and Lzjt, 20 S.C.L. Rtv. 765, at 781 (1968); 
Note, Human Organ Transplantation- Thr Mrdiml Mirarlr, supra note 2, at n.18; Sanders & 
Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 397. 
The jurisdiction over dead bodies and burials in early England was originally in ecclesiastical 
hands. Later, the ecclesiastical courts exercised control. Srr Note, Human Organ Transplanta-
tion, .llljJrrt note 2, at 422; Sanders & Dukeminier, supra, note 7, at 397. 
205. State v. Powell, 497 So. 2d 1188, 1192 (Fla. 1986) (quoting W. PROSSER, THE LAw oF 
ToRTS, 43-44 (2d ed. 19S5)). Acrord Kirker v. Orange County, 519 So. 2d 6R2, 684 at n.2 (Fla. 
Dist. Ct. App. 1988) 
206. Grorgia Lion.1 Eyr Bank, 335 S.E.2d at 128; Estate of Moyer, 577 P.2d 108, 110 n.5 
(Utah 1978); Tillman, 360 N.W.2d at 277. C). Mexican v. Circle Bear, 370 N.W.2d 737 (S.D. 
1985) (discussing precedence of tribal custom allowing the widow custody of her deceased husband 
over his express burial wishes). 
Through the years, the family has been given a remedy for injury if there is improper inter-
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Prior to the UAGA, since no one had a property interest in the 
body, no one could legally dictate how his/her body would be disposed 
of at death. 207 New York was apparently the first state to enact a stat-
ute that gave a right to dictate the disposition of one's own remains. 208 
Then, in 1968, the UAGA granted to individuals and their next of kin 
the uniform right to donate organs. However, if there is no family, then 
an official must take custody of the body for disposition. Thus, the legal 
right of an official to exercise control over an unclaimed body is both an 
extension of the 1968 Act and common law principles. 
The dissenting opinion in the Florida case recognizes the conflict 
between the common law and the UAGA. The 1968 UAGA altered the 
traditional common law principle by specifically giving to the family 
the right not only to consent to a gift but also to object to a removal. 209 
Thus, the presumed consent statutes that allow removal without a 
search for the family appear to contradict the rights granted by the 
1968 UAGA because the family's right to object has not been meaning-
fully exercised. However, the rights of coroners to remove tissue for 
testing and autopsy have also been recognized as supreme over the fam-
ily's rights, and this too is included in the 1968 UAGA. 210 
It is not easy to square the two apparently conflicting views, un-
less the issues of a required search and availability are separated. Al-
though the 1987 UAGA recognizes the extension of the 1968 UAGA's 
approach to allowing a coroner supreme access to the body for the pur-
poses of autopsy and investigation, neither statute presumes organ re-
moval as an incident to an autopsy. 211 Thus, the date of enactment of a 
removal statute, if prior to the 1968 UAGA, could be decisive of the 
priority of the coroner and the family over the body. However, such a 
point should not be the topic of endless judicial debate; rather, it is 
preferable that the 1987 UAGA's approach be used to resolve the issue. 
ment. Note, Law Ci LifP: Orr;an TransplrmLI, 111pra note 204, at 7R l; Sanders & Dukeminier, 
wpm note 7, at 398-99. 
207. Sanders & Dukeminier, sufJra note 7, at 395. 
208. Sanders & Dukeminier, sujun note 7, at 399 n.141 (citing New York's 1RR1 donation 
law). tvlany states did pass donation enabling legislation, which was a primary reason for the 
1968 UAGA. Note, ThP SalP of Human Body Parts, sujmz note 2, at 1185; Sanders & 
Dukeminier, supra note 7, at 401. 
209. 1968 UAGA, §§ 2, 7; 1987 UAGA, §§ 2, 6. 
210. 1968 UAGA, § 7(d). The rights granted to the next of kin in Section 2 of the CAGA 
are specifically made secondary to the autopsy laws in Section 7(d). 
211. For a discussion of earlier presumed consent laws, see Sanders & Dukeminier. supra 
note 7, at 412-13 n.189 (California); Note, TlzP SniP of Human Borly Parts, sujmJ note 2, at 
1212-14 (Hawaii, Maryland, Virginia, Nebraska, Nevada, California); Sarller & Sadler, supra 
note 64, at 16-17 (California, Hawaii, Virginia, D.C.); Dukeminier, supm note?., at 843 (Ha-
waii, Virginia); Quay, supra note 64, at 924-26 (florida, Louisiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Cali-
fornia, Washington, Oregon, Virginia, Maryland, Hawaii, Nebraska). 
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Thus, the hierarchy right of the family to donate and to object to a 
donation, as provided by the 1987 UAGA, should be maintained. The 
1987 UAGA merely extends the approach of the 1968 UAGA by pro-
viding that when no family are available, the duty to bury then falls to 
the state. As a result, the duty to bury is correlative to the right to 
donate. 
Both the 1968 and 1987 UAGA reflect the preferred approach to 
donation rights. Moreover, since every state adopted the 1968 UAGA, 
the present statutes that permit removal without a search and meaning-
ful opportunity by the family to object should have precedence over the 
pure presumed consent removal statutes. When, however, the family is 
not available after a reasonable search, then the coroner's right should 
be allowed. This approach is both desirable as well as historically 
sound. But, by not requiring a modicum of a search, the traditional 
approach is compromised. 212 
2. Section 5(a) 
The second section that has apparently sparked more controversy 
than Section 4 is Section S(a). Out of the eight adopting states, only 
Connecticut has included the section, and Hawaii has adopted only a 
diluted version. 
Section S(a) requires that a patient be asked if he is a donor at the 
time of his hospital admission. The Act does not require that the pa-
tient be pressured into making a donation. In fact, if the patient says 
yes, the response is simply recorded. For a patient who has made the 
decision to donate, there should not be trauma associated with being a 
declared organ donor. If the patient says no, then, and only if his doctor 
consents, can the hospital give the patient information about the option 
to refuse or to consent. 213 
There has already been experience with the routine hospital ad-
212. Pou·ell, 497 So. 2d at 1195, 1198 n.2 (dissenting opinion). 
213. One problem with this section is when a patient, who is asked about being a donor, 
replies in the negative but asks for more information. Under the strict interpretation of the Act, 
the nurse must await his physician's permission to discuss organ donation options. When the nurse 
returns, an obvious conclusion the patient may draw is that his physician considers him to be a 
prime candidate for donation. Thus, unnecessary trauma is potential with the specific, and some-
what overprotective, wording of Section S(a). 
However, the above criticism is not intended toward the aim of Section S(a); rather, there 
should be many more routine settings and questions imposed about organ donation. For instance, 
a comfortable setting is with life insurance sales. It is not uncommon for an estate planner or 
financial adviser to emphasize the importance of a will. The topic of donation could be comforta-
bly broached at such a time. Therefore, the routineness of Section S(a) type inquiries should be 
the responsibility of any professional group involved with the aspect of death: lawyers, clergy, 
funeral homes, and not just the medical profession. 
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mission inquiry. Several states incorporated the policy when adopting 
their routine inquiry law. By examining the states that have used the 
routine inquiry procedure, there may be a clue as to the reasons for the 
unpopularity of Section S(a). The proponents state that the question 
should be as routine as asking about allergies and thus should help to 
increase a potential donor pool as well as to make the public conscious 
of the potential decision to donate. 214 The opponents of the section, 
however, argue that the question may actually dissuade potential do-
nors because of the timing or setting. 
a. State routine inquiry tyj;es. Presently, there are four states with 
varying versions of routine hospital admission inquiry. These states are 
Arizona,2111 Georgia,216 Maryland,217 and New Jersey. 218 Mississippi 
represents the most recent state to have passed an admission policy and 
then to have repealed it within a year. 219 The action taken in Missis-
sippi is indicative of the negative attitude towards a mandatory inquiry 
m the hospital setting. 
b. Sunlfys. On the other hand, a study conducted by the Maximus 
214. 1987 UAGA, sujno note 6, at § 5(a) comment (citing a HASTINGS CENTER RFP.). 
215. ARIZ. REv. STAT. ANN. § 36-849E (Supp. 1989). Arizona's version is permissive in-
quiry to the patient. The provision provides that an authorized person "may obtain consent to 
donate from a patient . . on admission to the hospital as part of its standard admission proce-
dure." /d. (effective 1986). 
Delaware has a broadly worded provision that allows for a protocol to be developed that 
could require or merely allow inquiry to the patient or to his family at the time of an hospital 
admission. DEL CooF ANN. tit. 16, § 2721(b) (Supp. 1988). 
216. GA. CoDE ANN. § 44-5-143(d), -143.1(d) (Supp. 1989). The Georgia provisions are 
part of its routine inquiry qatute. The wording is very similar to what Massachusetts required at 
one time. 
When Massachusetts adopted the UAGA, it added the following section: 
Upon admission of a patient to any hospital at his request, the hospital shall record in 
a book kept for the purpose the expression of intent of such patient with regard to the 
disposition of his body and such expression shall be deemed sufficient notice under this 
section. 
MASS. GEN. L. ch. 113, §§ 7-13 (repealed 1986). 
Thus, the Georgia and Massachusetts provisions could be interpreted as requiring only that a 
book be maintained, but not necessarily that each patient must be asked whether he is a donor. 
217. MD. HEALTH-GEN. ConE ANN.§ 19-310 (Supp. 1988). The Maryland provision re-
quires that the patient or his family be asked whether he is a current donor, if the admission is 
non-emergency. 
218. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 26:6-60.1 (West Supp. 1 988). New Jersey's provision is mandatory 
and requires inquiry of the patient at the time of admission. This provision is part of New 
Jersey's routine inquiry law. 
21'!. Mrss. Com: ANN. § 41-}<J-15(2) (Supp. 1989) was enacted in 1987 but repealed in 
1988. 1988 Miss. Laws ch. 355 (effective 7 /1/88). The present version of§ 41-39-15(2) does not 
require an inquiry upon admission. 
The earlier version required that each patient on admission be asked whether he was a do-
nor, and if he replied no, then the patient was to he informed of his options to donate. Thus, 
Mississippi's version is substantially similar to the 1987 UAGA, which was drafted and proposed 
before Mississippi repealed its version. 
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organization in 1987 revealed that "[h ]ospitals that had initiated a re-
quest on admission program, reported no opposition from patients and 
believed the program, when handled appropriately, to be beneficial. " 220 
But an earlier Gallup survey conducted in January 1985 revealed 
several barriers to why people would not permit organ donation. One 
of the stated reasons given was a fear that the doctors might hasten 
death. 221 
The overwhelming lack of acceptance of Section S(a) thus far 
could indicate a serious problem in the continuing struggle to gain the 
acceptance of directly raising the topic of organ donation. Although 
Section S(a) appears to present a rather innocuous question to a patient 
as to whether the patient is an existing donor, the states that have so 
far omitted Section S(a) signal a continuing distaste for confronting the 
question of whether one is a donor. It may only be the setting of the 
hospital admission that generates the opposition. However, the more 
recent Maximus study indicates that the public has become more con-
scious and informed of organ donation options and procedures and thus 
amenable to Section S(a). 
B. Conrlusion 
Only sixteen states have formally considered the 1987 UAGA, 
with only eight states adopting a version of the 1987 UAGA within the 
two-year period since its proposal. 222 
Given the potential confusion that resulted when the states were 
adopting required request, it is important that the legislators carefully 
examine all of the laws that treat donation (unclaimed bodies, warran-
ties of services, organs/tissues) to avoid conflicts between any provi-
sions. So, deliberate consideration of the 1987 UAGA is advisable. 
To promote the 1987 UAGA, a state need only add to the proce-
dures of Sections 4 and S(a). Section 4 could be improved by detailing a 
procedure of what constitutes a "reasonable" search. Section S(a) 
should be expanded to develop the concept that physicians and insur-
ance companies should routinely document the answer to organ dona-
tion as the highway departments have, in order to establish an environ-
ment less threatening than a hospital upon admission. Expanding the 
potential settings is the better approach, instead of ignoring the possible 
2.?0 l\1aximus, Inc., Evaluation of Methods Used by States to Expand the Number of Organ 
and Tissue Ilonors, at Es-29 (Apr. 1988) (Final Report) (prepared for the U.S. Health Resources 
and Services Dep't. (HRSA Contract No. 240-86-0048)). 
221. Task Force Report, sujna note 9, at 38. 
222. Rhode Island and Utah have recently joined the eight states listed in this article who 
have adopted versions of the 1987 UAGA. Srr 1987 L:AGA, IUjJm note 6 (Supp. 1990). 
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advantage of Section S(a). In this way, the public's consciousness can be 
raised in more than one environment, and the goal of family discussions 
promoted. The result helps to avoid the more distressful time when the 
family has to be confronted and asked about organ donation when a 
family member has just died or is near death. 
It is the belief in immortality or the fear of dying that prevents 
some people from ever confronting the issue of organ donations. How-
ever, once the question becomes more routine, the more often an indi-
vidual will be aware that all admissions are asked the same question. 
As the public begins to compare their experiences, the topic of organ 
donation will become more discussed and acceptable, and less feared 
and unknown. 
Organ donation was available on a limited basis even before the 
UAGA of 1968, but organ donation has been continuously available 
since the success of the uniform procedures granted by the 1968 Act. If 
special interests groups are influencing the elimination of routine in-
quiry upon admission, then the consciousness of the public toward do-
nation is only being delayed. The public and the medical community 
have come far in valuing giving, but Sections 4 and S(a) of the 1987 
UAGA should not be rejected without appreciating that the public is 
more amenable to organ donation than other groups seem to under-
stand. Until there is uniformity in approaching the topic, the overall 
acceptance of a systematic approach to donation will only produce spo-
radic results. 
